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Behavioural Economics Posts Sustainable Energy Authority of Ireland

See below for some very interesting posts in the area of beheavioural economics and energy.

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Sustainable Energy Authority of Ireland (SEAI) is central to delivering a more sustainable energy future for everyone. Our role is to transform way we all use energy by moving to more efficient and clean sources, and by leading innovation in Ireland's approach to energy. We are currently looking to build our team across both technical and non-technical disciplines and are curently recuiting for the following positions:
  1. Programme Manager - Behavioural Economics Unit (job description and application details)|
  2. Programme Manager - Energy Efficiency Technical Support Unit (job description and application details)
  3. Programme Executive - Behavioural Economics Unit (job description and application details)
  4. Programme Executive - Better Energy Programmes (job description and application details)
  5. Programme Assistant - Behavioural Economics Unit (job description and application details)
  6. Programme Executive - Better Energy Deep Retrofit Programme (job description and application details)
Closing date for applications for the above posts is January 20th, 2017.
In addition to these positions, SEAI will be advertising early in 2017 for roles across a range of disciplines. If you are interested in working in an organisation that has a real and measurable impact on tackling our climate challenges, then watch this space.

Electoral College

Source: Real Clear Politics
The electoral college is back in the news, with Democrats suddenly discovering it's a terrible idea.

I wrote at length in defense of the college in a previous post. I wrote just before the 2012 election so I can credibly claim that my view is not a sudden discovery motivated by partisan feeling.

I don't want to repeat the whole post, though I'm still proud of it and hope I can send some traffic there.

Short version: The electoral college forces candidates to attract geographically dispersed support. Moving a swing state from 45% to 55% is much more important than moving a solid blue or solid red state from 75% to 85%.

This is vital. Our country is already polarized, and that polarization is reflected in geography.  See the map. A set of rules that encourages further polarization would be a disaster. American democracy failed miserably once. 700,000 people died and government of the people, by the people, and for the people nearly did perish from the earth. Things like this don't happen again only when people think they can, and vice versa.

In a pure popular vote contest, after candidates and parties adapt their positions and coalitions of support, we are likely to see whole swaths of the country with 70, 80, 90% or more majorities of one or the other party -- and even greater demonization of the other side. Fill in the gaps what happens next.

The deep point: When you set up rules for anything, there is a tension between measurement and incentives. Once people show up at the polls on election day, there is a strong case that "each vote should count the same." But if you do that, the incentives, and hence the outcomes will be much worse.


In the end, we care more about a good outcome -- good policy, and politics that keep the country from flying apart. So, swallow hard, measure imperfectly but set up better (slightly less bad) incentives.

This is a point worth repeating. It's the kind of thing that economists really do have to offer to students of politics and the world at large.  Good incentives for politicians, parties, and agendas  matter more than good measurement.

In that view, the important thing about the college is that we add up to the Presidency by winner-take-all over large geographic chunks. Whether we have actual electors is a separate issue. That means the movement by some states to apportion their electors according to the relative votes is a step in exactly the wrong direction, and induces more polarization.

I have learned some deep lessons from this election and especially its aftermath. Like most policy-wonk types I supposed that people care about policies, and about results, and vote accordingly. And are amenable to sensible discussion about policy, and sensible negotiation. If you're reading this blog, you probably fall in the same bubble. Most political analysis I've seen in economics runs the same way - we line voters up by policy preferences and then analyze voting systems.

What has become very clear to me since the election is a fact probably blindingly obvious to real students of politics -- that's not at all how it works. Most people vote by cultural affinity, brand, values, and a sense of personal identity.  To the extent policy matters at all, it's part of the buzzwords, propaganda and tag lines thrown back and forth.  These things are related to where you live and who you interact with on a regular basis, which is why geographic polarization is such a problem -- and why measures like the electoral college, which push our democracy to have more even representation of tribal and partisan alignments and identities are so important.

I live in a little Democratic bubble here in Palo Alto. Since the election, it is just remarkable how universally in public conversation, people assume that it would be impossible for anyone in earshot to sympathize with Republicans, let alone (heavens) actually be one or to have supported Mr. Trump. Going to book events with my wife, for example, the prelude to talking about the latest young adult fiction is moaning and groaning about how terrible this all is. Waiters at restaurants commiserate. These are good, caring people, achingly anxious never to offend anyone -- but it is simply beyond possibility that the person they're talking to, obviously a somewhat normal rational moral and caring person, not wearing a white sheet, could not feel the same way. I have traveled to a few Republican bubbles too, where people speak with similar certitude that there are no dissenting opinions around.

I got a good taste of this yesterday. I was listening yesterday to NPR, as Evan Osnos on the New Yorker Radio hour interviewed Anna Galland, executive director of moveon.org. (There's no transcript here, so forgive small errors of my transcription)

Evan started with the common Democratic complaint that Republicans, naming Mitch McConnell "famously said basically that they would do everything they could to .. try to interfere and to obstruct his [Obama's] presidency. Now we find that on the left there is a similar move to obstruct [Trump's] presidency obstruct Obama." Given the 8 years of complaint that Republican's obstruction was nefarious, reflected racism, or otherwise improper,  this was a good question. "What happened to ... some basis for cooperation?"

Ms. Galland's response was fascinating:
"Donald Trump lost the national popular vote.. He has no mandate. He's going to be trying to do the most extreme things in recent memory... It's not just a policy problem.. how are  we going to make it through the next 4 years with our constitutional democracy intact... and civil liberties?"  
"The order of the day here is to first stand up and project a clear moral opposition to what he's proposing to do to our country.. make sure people hear and see from people they relate to that I'm standing up." 
Mr. Osnos pressed:  "What's the argument against cooperating on shared objectives like a big infrastructure even if you object on values?" Ms. Galland replied that she felt there a moral case against cooperating with Trump on "basically anything."
"you can't play footsie with a white supremacist" 
For those of you who still think policy matters, the entire interview contained just one statement about actual policies -- just what the "most extreme things" Trump is going to do are,  and that she felt she would have to support in order to go along with an infrastructure bill:
"trying to deport millions of Americans or block an entire world's religion from entering the United States." 
Even on infrastructure -- a bill that has to get through a Congress, pass innumerable laws (Davis-Bacon, minority set-asides, etc.)
"there is no way that an infrastructure bill or any other initiative from Trump is going to advance progressive values... maybe well get three jobs out of it or a few roads repaired.. [we need instead]  a progressive infrastructure bill for the people not for billionaires"
Whatever that means. Describing moveon's many petitions, and why sign them, she said that petitions let people
 "connect with communities that share your common values.. moral commitments"
Now, our task today is to listen and think, not to take potshots at the low-hanging fruit. Gross falsehoods, "fake news," rampant hypocrisy? You bet. No, Mr. Trump is not a "white supremacist." (Where are the Facebook false-news raters now?) Since when does popular vote equal "mandate?" (A view I would be curious to see if she would have agreed with had Mrs. Clinton won with similar numbers. "Well, Mrs. Clinton swept the electoral college but didn't win the popular vote. So I really don't think she has the mandate to enact moveon's agenda over Republican's objections. We'll just have to let it wait four years?" Somehow I doubt it !) No, even if he deports millions of undocumented immigrants (something I oppose as strenuously as Ms. Galland), they are not in fact "Americans."  The chance that the Trump Administration will block any muslim from entering the United States is zero. How is this different from birtherism, calling President Obama a socialist or worse, and Republican rejectionism? Of course it isn't. Where was Ms. Galland when the Obama Administration was busy undermining constitutional democracy and civil liberties?

Sure, but leave that alone. It's not the point. And such argument is pointless.  Listen instead. This isn't about actual policy. It's about "values" and "morality." Somehow a highway bill, full of pork, signed by President Obama will advance "progressive values" and the exact same highway bill signed by President Trump will not.

This is not a set of views that rational argument can sway. When morality, values, and identity are at stake you will make no headway with that.

Ms. Galland has obviously never been in a room with a Republican whose opinion she cared a whit about, as you and I care about the good opinion of people we talk to. This is what happens when people live in self-confirming bubbles.

Well, power to her. Her job is to mobilize a base, demonize an opposition, spread around whatever propaganda including outright lies (sorry, that "white supremacist thing" qualifies), monger fears, and cast her tribe as the moral savior of the nation.

But we need a democracy in which a presidential candidate does not find Mrs. Galland's mindset a path to power. We need communities in which people understand that good people of many different values and identities live together (I wish I could call that "diverse" except the word has come to mean its opposite) and are forced by the rules of common decency to listen to each other.

The electoral college does that -- or at least is one small force keeping the trends in the other direction from getting stronger.

(By the way, the New Yorker ratio hour radio makes me listen to an ad proudly announcing that it is supported by Morgan Stanley and New York Life. Lenin was right about capitalists selling you the rope.)




Blog and Twitter Changes

As you can see, we have changed the title of the blog. It is now simply "economics, psychology, policy". The main function of the blog will continue to be to disseminate information in the areas of behavioural economics, economic psychology, and broad cognate areas. It will also be used to disseminate information about the activities in both the Dublin and Stirling research groups. The twitter account is also changing name to simply econpsypol and will also serve the above functions. I hope to post more and I welcome suggestions for interesting things we can do.

National Fellows at Hoover

How would you like to work at Hoover for a year, focusing on research with no teaching or other responsibilities, and soaking up the intellectual climate of Hoover and Stanford? If you are an economist roughly 3-10 years post PhD, doing research with some policy relevance that would benefit from a year here, this could be for you.

More information and application form here.


New Paper

A draft of a new paper is up on my webpage, "Michelson-Morley, Occam and Fisher: The Radical Implications of Stable Inflation at Near-Zero Interest Rates." This combines some talks I had given with the first title, and a much improved version of "does raising interest rates raise or lower inflation?"

Abstract:
The long period of quiet inflation at near-zero interest rates, with large quantitative easing, suggests that core monetary doctrines are wrong. It suggests that inflation can be stable and determinate under a nominal interest rate peg, and that arbitrary amounts of interest-paying reserves are not inflationary. Of the known alternatives, only the new-Keynesian model merged with the fiscal theory of the price level is consistent with this simple interpretation of the facts.
I explore two implications of this conclusion. First, what happens if central banks raise interest rates? Inflation stability suggests that higher nominal interest rates will result in higher long-run inflation. But can higher interest rates temporarily reduce inflation? Yes, but only by a novel mechanism that depends crucially on fiscal policy. Second, what are the implications for the stance of monetary policy and the urgency to “normalize?” Inflation stability implies that low-interest rate monetary policy is, perhaps unintentionally, benign, producing a stable Friedman-optimal quantity of money, that a large interest-paying balance sheet can be maintained indefinitely. However, with long run stability it might not be wise for central bankers to exploit a temporary negative inflation effect.
The fiscal anchoring required by this interpretation of the data responds to discount rates, however, and may not be as strong as it appears.
Big novelties in this draft -- at least things I have learned recently:

1) There is now a mechanism that produces a temporary decline in inflation from a rise in interest rates. It comes out of the fiscal theory of the price level and long term debt. If the Fed unexpectedly raises interest rates, that lowers nominal bond prices. If the real present value of surpluses does not change (if monetary policy does not change fiscal policy), then a lower nominal value of the debt and unchanged real value of the debt require a drop in the price level. It works, but it has nothing to do with your grandfather's ISLM, "aggregate demand,'' Phillips curve, money, sticky prices, and so on.

2) In this case and more generally, a temporary decline in inflation when interest rates rise unexpectedly does not rescue traditional policy advice!

It's only temporary! So you do not get long-lasting disinflation or stabilization out of raising rates. Raising rates gives you a temporary disinflation, then inflation gets worse. This is a mechanism perhaps for the 1970s, when each rate rise fell apart in more stagflation -- Chris Sims calls it "stepping on a rake" -- not the 1980s. For that sort of disinflation you need fiscal policy too.

And since only unexpected rate changes have the negative inflation effect, it can't be the basis of systematic, expected policy, like the Taylor rule in old-Keynesian models.

3) If unexpectedly raising interest rates lowers inflation temporarily, and then they go up, and vice versa, that doesn't mean it's a good idea for the Fed to exploit this mechanism for fine-tuning the path of inflation. the Fed is likely better off just raising interest rates and waiting.

In sum, there is a big difference between a temporary negative sign and a long run positive sign, long run stability, and the traditional view which is a temporary and permanent negatives sign and long-run instability.

4) All of this stability needs fiscal backing or "anchoring." Why do people want government debt so much with awful prospective deficits? The only reasonable answer is that we live in a time of very low interest rates. The present value of surpluses is high because the discount rates are low, not because prospective surpluses are large, but because discount rates are low. Discount rates could change quickly.

There will be a few more drafts of this paper and slides and talks. Unless one of you finds a big mistake and clears up my thinking on it.

The fact: interest rates hit zero, and nothing happened. No deflation spiral. No sunspot volatility. It seems that inflation is stable when interest rates are pegged.




Trump Taxes Two

Source: Wall Street Journal
"President-elect Donald Trump owns a helicopter in Scotland.
To be more precise, he has a revocable trust that owns 99% of a Delaware limited liability company that owns 99% of another Delaware LLC that owns a Scottish limited company that owns another Scottish company that owns the 26-year-old Sikorsky S-76B helicopter, emblazoned with a red “TRUMP” on the side of its fuselage."
So write Jean Eaglesham, Mark Maremont, and Lisa Schwartz in the Wall Street Journal

"WTF?" wonders the incredulous reader. Why does Mr. Trump structure his finances with such mind-boggling complexity, to say nothing of astronomic legal costs? The article is pretty thin on explaining the logic of all this.

You can see the Journal writers struggling for a narrative. Is this about Mr. Trump's "conflict of interest" issues? Is this something nefarious about Mr. Trump, efforts to hide something? (You can be sure earnest investigative reporters at the Times will be beating both drums for the next four years. And just as sure that nobody will pay much attention unless they can tempt Mr. Trump into saying something stupid about it all.)

Let me suggest a productive narrative. Mrs. Clinton's email saga laid bare for all of us to see the financial arrangements of prominent public figures -- "charitable foundations" to funnel money around, all "legal." In my view, rightly felt disgust at that look into our political system had a lot to do with the election. Mr. Trump's financial arrangements lay bare for all of us to see the financial arrangements of the super-wealthy in this country, also massively complex, perfectly "legal," and smelling equally of last week's fish. The right response is equal disgust at the obscene tax code and crony capitalist system that produces this mess.  Mitt Romney's taxes were 550 pages long, and he only had investments, not operating companies! Fellow peasants, get out your pitchforks!


What are all these shell companies about? I would love to hear from some of the attorneys who set these things up. But we get some hint from the article
LLCs registered in Delaware are widely used for real estate because of their tax advantages.
Delaware LLCs don't have to publish any financial information or even disclose the identity of the owner. In addition, the most a member of an LLC can lose if the company fails is normally the amount he or she has invested in that company
I actually know something about this because, like Mr. Trump I own an aircraft. Mine doesn't even have an engine, but the law is the same. When you register an aircraft, the state sales tax authorities come looking for you and want their share. If you register the aircraft in a Delaware LLC, they have a much tougher time finding you. Google "Delaware Aircraft Registration" and many ads from very nice companies will pop up explaining it all. If your airplane is worth less than $100,000, it's not worth the bother. (Disclosure: I paid the sales tax. Chump that I am.) If its worth millions, it is very much worth the bother. Google the FAA aircraft registry (public, online) and you will see lots of Delaware owners. Hint, there aren't a lot of airports in Delaware.

I suspect this is about a lot more than sales taxes. There has been another drumbeat that Mr. Trump should sell or transfer his businesses to his children. This is ridiculous to anyone who pays taxes. If you actually sell a business you pay a huge capital gains tax, and if you transfer it you pay a huge gift tax. The affairs of real estate moguls are exquisitely structured to avoid estate and gift taxes, through vehicles and trusts that need to operate over long spans of time. It helps a lot to have very complicated structures where nobody knows what anything is worth.

(The second big advantage, mentioned in the above ads, is protection from liability. If the plane crashes into a puppy farm, they won't be able to go after Mr. Trump's other assets.)

The journal article also tries on the narrative that we don't know how much Mr. Trump is really worth, I think keeping up the spin from the campaign that maybe he was lying about his billions. But that too deserves a better narrative. We don't know how much he's worth. Neither does Mr. Trump, pretty obviously. Why did he set up his businesses so it is impossible for even him to know how much he's worth? Well, stated that way, one conjectures it's a pretty good idea for the IRS to be unable to figure out how much you're worth too!

Every time a sensible person pipes up that we should repeat 1986, lower marginal rates of the federal income tax, broaden the base, and simplify the tax code, our friends on the left (including a lot of prominent economists, who should know better than to echo propaganda) scream "tax cuts for the rich!" Reading this story, I can imagine just how much Mr. Trump's lawyers and accountants chuckle when they hear that. Personal income taxes? Who even bothers with those!

What has happened to America that, if you have the money to buy a plane, it is perfectly normal to route that purchase through a network of Delaware LLCs? What has happened to America that any citizen living on an investment portfolio should file 550 pages of personal tax returns? What has happened to America that if you ask for estate planning, even just on the web, it is perfectly normal that any citizen should set up a living trust, a trust A and trust B to get spousal exemptions, a descendants' trust to preserve the generation-skipping limit, and if you have any real money a grantor retained annuity trust and so on? What has happened to America that every wealthy person, and especially sports personalities, politicians and moguls, sets up a "charity" so they can write off private jet travel, the salaries of their entourage, and "employ" their relatives? Workers of America (and by this I mean rather unfashionably people who, like, actually work, and therefore pay taxes) unite, you have nothing to lose but your piles of papers and what should be your seething sense of injustice!

Really, and I appeal to my friends on the left here: Seeing this insanity, don't you want to throw it all out and have a simple VAT or consumption tax -- and nothing else? Both Mr. Trump and Mrs. Clinton would pay a lot more taxes! (The Hall-Rabushka proposal is one good implementation.)

Drain the swamp, please, Mr. Trump. The tax code is a good place to start. When all the lawyers and accountants who set these things up for you are driving for Uber,  you will know you have done a good job.

(Previous Trump Tax post here.)



Growth full oped

Source: Wall Street Journal

On November 7 I wrote "Don't believe the economic pessimists," an oped about growth in the Wall Street Journal. Now that 30 days have passed, I can post the whole thing here. pdf here (my webpage).

Don't Believe the Economic Pessimists

No matter who wins Tuesday’s presidential election, now ought to be the time that policy makers in Washington come together to tackle America’s greatest economic problem: sclerotic growth. The recession ended more than seven years ago. Unemployment has returned to normal levels. Yet gross domestic product is rising at half its postwar average rate. Achieving better growth is possible, but it will require deep structural reforms.

The policy worthies have said for eight years: stimulus today, structural reform tomorrow. Now it’s tomorrow, but novel excuses for stimulus keep coming. “Secular stagnation” or “hysteresis” account for slow growth. Prosperity demands more borrowing and spending—even on bridges to nowhere—or deliberate inflation or negative interest rates. Others advocate surrender. More growth is impossible. Accept and manage mediocrity.

But for those willing to recognize the simple lessons of history, slow growth is not hard to diagnose or to cure. The U.S. economy suffers from complex, arbitrary and politicized regulation. The ridiculous tax system and badly structured social programs discourage work and investment. Even internet giants are now running to Washington for regulatory favors.

If you think robust growth is impossible, consider a serious growth-oriented policy program—one that could even satisfy many of the left’s desires.


• Taxes. The ideal tax system raises revenue for the government while distorting economic decisions as little as possible. A pure tax on consumption, with no corporate, income, estate, or other taxes is pretty close to that ideal.

The U.S. tax system is the opposite: By exempting lots of income, the government raises relatively little money. Yet an extra dollar is heavily taxed, greatly lowering incentives and encouraging people to find or create exemptions. This massive complexity and obscurity undermine faith in the system.

Progressives, ponder this: With a sales tax of only 25%, the government would likely have gotten a lot more money from Donald Trump—who has employed complex but legal tax-avoidance schemes—than it did by purporting to tax income at high rates.

• Regulation. U.S. regulation is arbitrary, slow, discretionary and politicized. Speak out on the wrong side of the party in power and some federal agency will be after you.

Imagine a deep rule-of-law regulatory reform, along the lines proposed by House Speaker Paul Ryan’s “Better Way” plan. Congress must review and approve major regulations. People and businesses have a right to see evidence and appeal. Regulators face a shot clock—no more years and years of delays on decisions. Agencies must conduct serious, transparent and retrospective cost-benefit analysis.

Imagine a similar deep reform of state and local restrictions including zoning laws and occupational-licensing regulations.

• Social programs. When many people earn an extra dollar, they lose more than a dollar of benefits. If we fixed these disincentives, more Americans would work—and fewer would need benefits.

• Health. Replace ObamaCare with a simple health-insurance voucher. Deregulate insurance and entry into health care dramatically.

• Finance. Replace strangling regulation of financial companies with a simple rule: If you issue enough equity that stockholders bear the risks, you can do what you want. Rep. Jeb Hensarling has proposed such legislation. Hearty competition is the best consumer protection.

• Labor. The best worker protection is a worker’s ability to swiftly change jobs. This is more likely if employers do not face a mountain of red tape, complex rules and legal liability.

• Immigration and trade. The politically incorrect truth: Allowing Americans to buy from the best supplier and permitting people who want to work and start businesses to immigrate is good for the economy. Trying to impoverish China will not revive America.

• Education. Let lower-income Americans get a decent education from charter schools and vouchers.

• Energy. Trade all the crony subsidies and credits and regulations for a simple uniform revenue-neutral carbon tax. The country will have more growth and less carbon.

It would take an entrenched obtuseness to claim such a program cannot substantially improve economic output and incomes. If you claim such good policy cannot help, then it follows that bad policies do not hurt. Nativism, trade barriers, overregulation, legal capture, high taxes, controlled markets and people excluded from work won’t hurt our slow but positive growth. Don’t give populists cover to try it again.

If you object that such good policy is politically infeasible, then you at least grant that robust growth is economically possible. And small steps help. Current bipartisan proposals to reform taxes, Social Security, immigration, the regulatory state and trade agreements would go a long way to reviving growth. Have a bit more faith in democracy.

On the other hand, the major party presidential candidates’ signature plans—child-care tax credits, college subsidies, higher taxes on people who don’t hire good enough lawyers; threatening a trade war and deporting millions of unauthorized immigrants—cannot revive substantial growth.

So why is there so little talk of serious growth-oriented policy? Regulated and protected industries and unions, and the politicians who extract support from them in return for favors, will lose enormously. The global policy elite, steeped in Keynesian demand management for the economy as a whole, and microregulation of individual businesses, are intellectually unprepared for the hard project of “structural reform”—fixing the entire economy by cleaning up the thousands of little messes. Even economists fight to protect outdated skills.

Mr. Cochrane is a senior fellow of the Hoover Institution and an adjunct scholar of the Cato Institute.

The next crisis?

Where will the next crisis come from?  Every crisis starts with a pile of debt that can't be paid back, and shady accounting to hide that debt. When one big one goes under, everybody starts to question the shady deals they've invested in, the extend-and-pretend game ends, heretofore simple rolling over of short term debt suddenly ends, and the run starts. Governments bail out. Really big crises happen when governments run out of bailout power or will and you have a sovereign debt crisis or inflation. Governments bail out by borrowing, but if people won't lend the government money to bail out, either default or inflation must follow.  Reinhart and Rogoff describe a frequent "quiet period" between financial crisis and sovereign crisis. So far we have just had quiet.

So, where around the world is there a lot of debt that might not be paid back and really shady accounting? Well, duh, China, right?

So if I have to dream up a nightmare scenario it goes something like this: A pile of debt in China is found wanting. China's government takes desperate steps -- huge bailouts, sell its pile of treasuries, force people to buy worthless assets, print up lots of money, but prop up its value by stopping people from taking currency abroad, and so forth.


The next step is some sort of "contagion" to the rest of the world. Foreign businesses turn out to have invested more in China than we think (shady accounting again). Or supply chains are disrupted, we discover we're pretty darn dependent on trade and so on.

Meanwhile, the usual "information-insensitive" securities become "information-sensitive" in Gary Gorton's nice language. Italian banks are ready to go, and a hint Italy might leave the euro to bail them out might enough to get the Italy run going. Seeing China blow up might be just the hint people need to think about that. That event would be enough to put Italian and European  sovereigns at risk, or force the ECB to real monetization in the trillions.

Can it spread to the US? We're usually the quality to which people fly. But Illinois and California's pensions don't look a lot better than Chinese banks really. Student loans loom. The Federal government has guaranteed a lot of debts! And the long-run cash flow forecasts for the US government aren't great. The prospects of a strong economy help demand for our debt, but a China-Europe crisis could well send us back to a recession. And in a global sovereign crisis, China and Europe will be cashing in their treasuries.  Can we really borrow another $5 trillion  for bailout and stimulus while foreigners are dumping $4-5 trillion or so of our treasuries?

This is absolutely not a forecast. The definition of a crisis is that it is unpredictable. It needs a lot of things to go wrong, a lot of firebreaks to fail. (Equity is one essential firebreak against asset failure turning in to liability failures.) After the event, it becomes obvious, and we hail a few lucky guessers (ignoring those guessers' may other wrong calls).

At best it is a scenario, a chain of events that could happen, with very small probability.   The next crisis -- there will be one, someday, until that charmed day that the world adopts equity-financed banking and governments run fiscal surpluses -- may come from somewhere else totally.  But the art of risk management is to think through improbable chains of events.

Why bring it up now? Well, in today's Wall Street Journal Lingling Wei reports that "China's banks are hiding more than $2 Trillion in loans," In the lead editorial rightly making fun of currency manipulation, the WSJ notes that China has already dumped $1 Trillion dollars of its reserves (likely US Treasuries) and facing $100 billion per quarter capital outflows. China is imposing strong limits on its citizens ability to move capital out of the country (translation: sell Chinese currency, bonds, bank accounts and get same in dollars abroad). At the start of the new year, individual Chinese will be allowed to take out their yearly allotment. I would guess they do it soon.

All these are signs of propping a currency up, not pushing it down; declining demand for currency and bonds that will be needed if China wants to do a massive bailout of bad debts. (Allow bankruptcies? Well, we in "capitalist" America don't do it, so I doubt China will do it either.)

These are signs that a run on China is already starting. Not all runs explode. Many fizzle out. But maybe this first link in the chain is closer to blowing up than we think. How are those firebreaks doing?

Balance sheet balance

The Fed has a huge "balance sheet" -- It owns about $3 trillion of government bonds and mortgage backed securities, which it finances by issuing about $1 trillion of cash and $2 trillion of reserves -- interest-bearing accounts that banks have at the Fed. Is this a problem? Should the Fed trim the balance sheet going forward?

On Tuesday Dec 6, I participated on a panel at Hoover's Washington offices to discuss the book "Central Bank Governance And Oversight Reform" with very distinguished colleagues, Michael Bordo, Charles Plosser, John Taylor, and Kevin Warsh. We're not afraid to disagree with each other on panels -- there's no "Hoover view" one has to hew to, so I learned a lot and I think we came to some agreement on this issue in particular.


Me: The balance sheet is not a problem. The Fed is just one gargantuan money market fund, invested in Treasuries, with a credit guarantee from the Treasury. Interest bearing reserves are perfect substitutes to bonds. The Fed is just making change, taking $20 bills (Treasuries) and giving out $5 and $10 in return. The Fed can easily run monetary policy by just paying more or less interest on reserves.

Plosser: The balance sheet is a big problem. Yes, John's right that interest bearing reserves won't cause inflation so long as banks just sit on them. But will banks just sit on them? Right now, banks don't see enough profitable lending opportunities to care. But if they do, will the Fed really pay enough interest to keep hugely inflationary amounts of reserves from feeding the money supply? What will Congress say when the Fed is paying 3%, 4%, or more to banks to bribe the banks not to lend money to American business and consumers?

Worse, focus on what the Fed is buying not what it is issuing. If the Fed were just buying short-term treasuries John might have a point. But it's buying long term bonds, intervening in the bond market; mortgage backed securities, funneling money to houses. This is credit allocation. The ECB is buying corporate bonds and the BOJ is buying stocks. Congress already raided some of the Fed's assets. So there may not be a big economic problem but there is a huge political economy problem.

(This isn't a quote, and I'm going from memory as we don't have a record of the panel. I hope I'm not mis-characterizing Plosser's view too much. If I am, well, take it as what I learned from the discussion and my own much better sympathy for a countervailing view.)

Taylor: The Fed should not just wind down the huge balance sheet, but it should go back to a very small amount of reserves that do not pay interest. Then it should go back to controlling interest rates by open market operations, and a binding money multiplier. (Taylor, being a lot more polite than the rest of us, did not go into detail on this, but I think he's worried about the Fed being able to control interest rates under interest on reserves (IOR), and whether changing interest rates under IOR with a slack multiplier will make any difference. Again, if this isn't Taylor's view, at least it is a view that I appreciate more after the discussion.)

Well, how to we reconcile this?

I think Plosser is right about the asset side of the balance sheet, and he seems to think I'm mostly right about the liability side. How to square that circle?

I think we would all be happier if the Fed did not keep maturity and credit risk on its balance sheet. Instead, if the Fed really wants to intervene quickly in asset markets and buy anything but short term treasuries (a big if, but there seemed to be consensus that at least in a crisis such purchases might have to be made) then the Fed should swap them to the Treasury within, say, 6 months, so any long-term credit allocation and risk is in the Treasury where it belongs.

(This is, I think, illegal right now. The Fed cannot deal directly with the Treasury, one of many bright little ways our ancestors set up the system to prevent inflationary finance. But that can be fixed.)

And, granted that large amounts of interest-bearing reserves are a good thing -- lots of non-inflationary oil in the economic car -- the Fed doesn't have to be the one to provide them. I brought up again my proposal that the Treasury should issue fixed-value floating-rate small-denomination electronically-transferable debt -- i.e. reserves -- to everyone, not just banks. You should be able to go to treasury.gov and sign up for the treasury's money market fund. All the Fed is doing by buying short-term treasuries and issuing reserves is creating this new class of government debt out of other kinds of government debt. Why not have the Treasury issue it directly? Then the Fed could in fact wind down its balance sheet to near nothing, without losing any of the liquidity and financial stability benefits of interest on reserves.

Plosser seems to go along. Taylor not yet, but sitting on a panel it was hard for any of us to think how this would work in a world of very small non interest bearing bank reserves. (I think it would -- Treasury floaters would not be much different from short term treasury debt from a bank's perspective.)

So we learn from each other on the panel, as well as the sharp questions from the audience. Thanks to everyone who came (and to our second panel on the Blueprint for America), it was a very productive day.

Update
Discussion now available online, embed below, link here. Now we can see how my memory matches up with the facts.

Scaling up Randomised Trials in Public Policy

The paper below co-authored by many of the leading figures in the application of randomised trials in public policy is well worth reading.
From Proof of Concept to Scalable Policies: Challenges and Solutions, with an Application 
Abhijit Banerjee, Rukmini Banerji, James Berry, Esther Duflo, Harini Kannan, Shobhini Mukerji, Marc Shotland, and Michael Walton
Abstract
The promise of randomized controlled trials (RCTs) is that evidence gathered through the evaluation of a specific program helps us—possibly after several rounds of fine-tuning and multiple replications in different contexts—to inform policy. However, critics have pointed out that a potential constraint in this agenda is that results from small, NGO-run “proof-of-concept” studies may not apply to policies that can be implemented by governments on a large scale. After discussing the potential issues, this paper describes the journey from the original concept to the design and evaluation of scalable policy. We do so by evaluating a series of strategies that aim to integrate the NGO Pratham’s “Teaching at the Right Level” methodology into elementary schools in India. The methodology consists of re-organizing instruction based on children’s actual learning levels, rather than on a prescribed syllabus, and has previously been shown to be very effective when properly implemented. We present RCT evidence on the designs that failed to produce impacts within the regular schooling system but helped shape subsequent versions of the program. As a result of this process, two versions of the programs were developed that successfully raised children’s learning levels using scalable models in government schools.
A common criticism of randomised controlled trials in Economics is that the causal effects they examine are too local in nature. They apply to a particular site, at a particular time, and are specific to aspects of the treatment and how it was implemented etc., Furthermore, results that apply in trials may have different effects when scaled to a population e.g. an effective education intervention scaled to the entire population may affect the labour market in various ways that can't be understood from the trial data. Furthermore, political effects such as public backlash or political corruption may apply differently to well-designed and intensely monitored trials than to large national scaled programmes. The paper goes in detail to many such problems with RCTs and should be read for this reason alone by anyone working on or interested in applying this approach.

So, given these problems, how can we go from the results of such trials to examine policy systems as a whole?. The authors provide an example of a large-scale education study in India where various different approaches were taken, working with the government, to scale an education intervention to 33 million children. They describe how different interventions were developed based on evidence on child learning and then rolled out in different provinces, with many attempts to control for context dependence. They describe the role of RCT data in the context of scale-up and the various challenges that result from an administrative perspective when attempting to scale up interventions that have been shown to be successful at trial stage. The authors draw a number of general lessons about the importance of iteration, close working relationships with administrative bodies, good process evaluation, and a range of other factors that must be in place to allow for successful scale up.


Carrier Commentary

When Paul Krugman, Larry Summers,  Sarah Palin, and the Wall Street Journal all agree on something -- that presidential deal-making and strong-arming over plant location is a terrible idea -- it's worth paying attention to.

I think Tyler Cowen did the best job of describing what's wrong with the deal, interviewed on NPR. (Transcript, Highlights and audio link).

(This is an impressive radio interview. I long to be able to express something that quickly clearly and coherently on radio. Tyler must have really prepared hard for it.)
INSKEEP: Don Evans says this is a way for the president-elect to send a strong message to workers and to corporations about what his priorities are. What's wrong with that?

TYLER COWEN: We're supposed to live under a republic of the rule of law. Not the rule of man. This deal is completely non-transparent. And the notion that every major American company has to negotiate person-to-person with the president over Twitter is going to make all business decisions politicized.


INSKEEP: What do you mean it's nontransparent, first of all?

COWEN: We don't know exactly what the company is getting. There's plenty of talk that the reason Carrier went along with the deal was because they were afraid their parent company would lose a lot of defense contracts. So this now creates the specter of a president always being willing to punish or reward companies depending on whether or not they give him a good press release.

INSKEEP: Why don't you explain to me the thing about the parent company, which is United Technologies?

COWEN: Yes, they do a lot of defense contracting. It's at least 10 percent of their revenue. Carrier, from the state of Indiana, was already offered the tax break before the election. They turned it down. Now, all of a sudden, Trump is President. Bernie Sanders is telling Trump to threaten the defense contract of the parent company, and now, all of a sudden, the company takes the deal. And Trump is known for being somewhat vindictive. This, to me, is scary. It indicates an environment where business decisions are now about how much you please the president.

INSKEEP: Now, you just said an interesting thing. Bernie Sanders, a socialist of the Democratic Party, did, a few days before the deal was announced, say that Trump ought to use the leverage of the defense contracts to get United Technologies to change its behavior. We don't know on a factual basis that's actually what happened, but - but you're noting that this is kind of a leftist thing to do.

COWEN: That's correct. Trump and Bernie Sanders, for all of their populist talk, their are actual recipes in both cases lead to crony capitalism.

INSKEEP: What's crony capitalism?

COWEN: Crony capitalism is a system where businesses who are in bed with the government and who give the president positive press releases are rewarded and where companies who oppose or speak out against the president are, in some way, punished.

INSKEEP: David Wessel of the Brookings Institution said on our air the other day that this act reminded him of something that is done from time to time in France - under the socialist government in France. And I'm also thinking of Venezuela, where the late President Hugo Chavez would go on TV and denounce companies and demand that companies do specific things. And of course, the economy there has ended up being a complete mess. Is that - is that a fair comparison at all?

COWEN: Well, we're not close to that point yet, but we're taking baby steps in that direction. And the way you avoid getting to that point is by having people speak out when they see the baby steps.

INSKEEP: If the president-elect gets results, at least some of the jobs - at least for now - are staying in Indiana. Does it really matter how he does it?

COWEN: Well, keep in mind the broader numbers. Since the year 2000, Indiana has lost 150,000 manufacturing jobs. And this, at best, assuming all goes well, saves a thousand of those. So to actually make a dent in the problem, jawboning isn't the way to do it. It's changing economic incentives and making it more cost-effective to hire people in the United States. And none of this really does that.
(If it's not obvious one could add, 1) Every million dollars of tax break Carrier gets to stay in Indiana is a million dollars someone else has to pay instead -- likely a smaller company that hires more people. 2) If the US could, in fact, take jobs back from Mexico, then each such job taken back is one more Mexican who wants to migrate to the US. 3) Capital and current accounts add up. If carrier invests $1 M in Mexico, then US exports must increase by $1M. And vice versa. 4) If it's profitable to build air conditioners in Mexico, then someone else will do it and that Carrier plant is toast anyway.)

Brooks and Shields

Who will defend President-Elect Trump? Surprisingly, Mark Shields, in a very interesting Shields and  Brooks segment on the PBS newshour.

First David Brooks did a great job of slamming the deal, as Cowen did
 The job of government is to be a level playing field where companies compete and make money honestly. And by rewarding one company over another, by getting involved in these sort of petty deals, the first thing you’re doing is encouraging rent-seeking, for companies to make money off government, rather than the honest way. 
And the second thing, it’s — and especially in this administration, it’s an invitation to corruption. If you’re cutting deals with company after company, doing this kind of deal, that kind of deal, inevitably, there is going to be a quid pro quo. There is going to be under-the-table lobbying. 
And it’s just a terrible precedent for our economy and for the administration. 
 But that's easy. Shields, the "left" commenter, had the harder job, defending Trump's action:
I think it is bad public policy. I think it’s a political masterstroke. I think Donald Trump raised this issue during the campaign. When it first appeared, when Carrier showed the gross insensitivity, where it was on YouTube, where they went in and told the 1,000 workers that their jobs were leaving, that the company was leaving, and it was just — it was abjectly insensitive to the workers. And Donald Trump picked that up. It was part of his prairie populism of the time, unlike his Cabinet appointments to Treasury and Commerce.
And I think Donald Trump, this is a masterstroke that he said he would do something, he did it, and it’s been a long time since the president of the United States has made that kind of an announcement.
Is it a coherent national macro-policy? No. But as a micro-act, it’s a very positive act politically. And I think it reflects better upon him and his commitment to these people and their well-being and their survival than an awful lot that’s happened in the past.
I'm almost -- but not quite -- convinced. Shields' narrow window of hope is that this was a one-off, rather brilliant symbolic political act, and that now the Trump administration will focus on serious policy, which mostly means bringing rule of law back to regulation and eliminating interference of this sort.

Yes, presidential politics is not ivory tower economics, and occasionally Presidents have to do something abjectly wrong to garner support for a greater purpose. It's a delicate and dangerous act though -- if this is where we're going, early in an administration is the best time to do some hard things, set in motion policies that actually work, set a high bar against demands for cronyist payouts, and trust that four years of good policy will pay off.

The best hope in this direction is for the President to score some points, and for a loud chorus of serious policy people, from left and right, to denounce any more moves in this direction. This is exactly what has happened.  Really, it gives one great hope that just about every commentator left and right says this is not the way to go.

Shields and Brooks are also nicely consistent. Shields:
I give Barack Obama great credit for the rescue of the United States automobile industry. It saved hundreds of thousands of jobs. 
Unlike, say, Paul Krugman, who has been madly tweeting (correctly) that Carrier is bad policy -- but the same thing done by Democratic administrations such as the auto bailout are of course fantastic ideas.

Peggy Noonan

I was most disappointed in Peggy Noonan, usually excellent, in the Wall Street Journal, and approving of the deal for all the wrong reasons: to her it wasn't just a little political pandering thank you, but the path forward
This is called economic nationalism but whatever its name it suggests a Republicanism in new accord with the needs of the moment...
She went on to tell the story of a related Kennedy escapade. Excerpts:
It was 1961 and the new president, John F. Kennedy, had been trying to signal to big business that they could trust him.. His impulses were those of a moderate of his era: show budgetary constraint, keep costs and prices down, prevent inflation.....

That September Kennedy asked the industry to forgo a price increase. He asked the steelworkers union for wage demands... Early in 1962 his labor secretary, Arthur Goldberg, put together a deal. In the spring the union and the steel companies accepted it. Everyone understood the industry would not raise prices.

A few days later Roger Blough, chairman of the board of mighty U.S. Steel, asked to see the president. He handed him a four-page mimeographed statement announcing his company would raise steel prices $6 a ton. ...
Soon Bethlehem Steel raised its prices. Other companies followed.

Now Kennedy was enraged. Accepting Blough’s decision would undo all his wage-price guideposts. It would also constitute a blow to the prestige of the presidency. And labor would never trust him again.

So he went to war. At a news conference the next day he called the steel companies’ actions “a wholly unjustifiable and irresponsible defiance of the public interest” by “a tiny handful of steel executives whose pursuit of private power and profit exceeds their sense of public responsibility.” He implied they were unpatriotic in a time of national peril. ...

Kennedy ordered the Defense Department to shift its steel purchases from U.S. Steel to companies that hadn’t raised prices. The Justice Department under Attorney General Robert Kennedy launched an antitrust investigation, summoned a federal grand jury, and sent FBI agents to the homes and offices of steel executives. There were rumors of threats of IRS investigations of expense accounts and hotel bills. (my emphasis)

Bethlehem Steel was the first to back down. A week after informing the president of the price increase, Roger Blough returned to the White House to surrender...
I emphasized the paragraph of actions that Kennedy took. Each measure is blatantly illegal and an abuse of power. If you think abuse of the regulatory state and prosecutorial power for political purposes are new dangers, let this remind you just how far back it goes.

Curiously, Peggy seems to get that.
It was a big win for Kennedy but it was a bloody affair, and on some level he knew it. His relations with business never quite recovered. The administration’s brutality left a stain. Robert Kennedy’s ruthlessness inspired the anti-nepotism law that is said, these days, to bedevil the Trump family. A nascent, national conservative movement was embittered and emboldened: Barry Goldwater said JFK was trying to “socialize the business of the country,” and decided soon after to run against him.
... presidents shouldn’t abuse their power—and he did. They especially can’t do it to shore up their own political position, and he did that, too. 
So how does she justify it?
But it’s also true he thought he was right on the policy and that the policy would benefit the American people.
And the American people could tell. His approval ratings, high then, stayed high. People appreciate energy in the executive when they suspect it’s being harnessed for the national good. The key is to wield it wisely and with restraint. But yes, a little muscle judiciously applied can be a unifying thing.
No, Peggy.  Crucially, he was wrong on the policy. No, we do not fight inflation by jawboning companies and unions not to raise prices. That does not "benefit the American people." This isn't fancy economics. Leaders from Emperor  Diocletian to Nicolás Maduro have tried to quell inflation by muscling businesses -- sending police to terrorize businessmen in their homes -- not to raise prices, and it always ends with more muscle and more inflation -- as Kennedy's did.

He may have "thought" he was right. His Keynesian advisers had also forgotten lessons of two thousand years of history and thought jawboning an excellent idea. But this is precisely why we have a rule of law -- so that leaders who "think" they are right about the proper level of steel prices cannot wreck the economy.

Just as Trump's action is abjectly wrong on policy. For just as many thousands of years, leaders have been cutting Carrier-like deals, to just as contrary effect. It is our duty to say that, to undercut the political popularity that presidents can gain by counterproductive policies, especially when the means trample the rule of law.

"a Republicanism in new accord with the needs of the moment" is a Republicanism that works. And the point of "work" is not just to win the next election, or give people things that feel good but impoverish them. The need of the moment is leadership, to channel people's well deserved anger into a productive direction.

I hope Peggy will someday write a piece titled, "the worst sentence I ever wrote," in honor of
"A little muscle judiciously applied can be a unifying thing," 
especially when the "unification" comes by feeding people falsehoods like Carrier deals save jobs, or jawboning lowers inflation.  Just how does this not describe Castro? Or Chavez? Or...well, fill in the blanks.

A Better Choice

Roll up your shirtsleeves, financial economists. As reported by Elizabeth Dexheimer at Bloomberg, Rep. Jeb Hensarling is “interested in working on a 2.0 version,”  of his financial choice act, the blueprint for reforming Dodd-Frank. “Advice and counsel is welcome."

The core of the choice act is simple. Large banks must fund themselves with more capital and less debt. It strives for a very simple measure of capital adequacy in place of complex Basel rules, by using a simple leverage ratio. And it has a clever carrot in place of the stick. Banks with enough capital are exempt from a swath of Dodd-Frank regulation.

Market based alternatives to a leverage ratio

The most important question, I think, is how, and whether, to improve on the leverage ratio with simple, transparent  measure of capital adequacy. Keep in mind, the purpose is not to determine a minimum capital level at which a bank is resolved, closed down, bailed out, etc. The purpose is a minimal capital ratio at which a bank is so systemically safe that it can be exempt from a lot of regulation.

The "right" answer remains, in my view, the pure one: 100% equity plus long term debt to fund risky investments, and short term liabilities entirely backed by treasuries or reserves (various essays here). But, though I still think it's eminently practical, it's not on the current agenda, and our task is to come up with something better than a leverage ratio for the time being.

Here are my thoughts. This post is an invitation to critique and improve.

Market values. First, we should use the market value of equity and other assets, not the book value. Risk weights are complicated and open to games, and no asset-by-asset system captures correlations between assets. Value at risk does, but people trust the correlations in those models even less than they trust risk weights. Accounting values pretend assets are worth more than they really are, except when accounting values force marks to market that are illiquid or "temporarily impaired."

Market values solve these problems neatly. If the assets are unfairly marked to market, equity analysts know that and assign a higher value to the equity. If assets are negatively correlated so the sum is worth more than the parts, equity analysts now that and assign a higher value to the equity.


Liabilities not assets. Second, we should use the ratios of liability values,  not ratios to asset values.   Rather than measure a ratio of equity to (accounting) asset values, look at the ratio of equity to the debt that the bank issues. Here, I would divide market value of equity by the face value of debt, and especially debt under one year. We want to know, can the bank pay off its creditors or will there be a run.

In principle, the value of assets = the value of liabilities so it shouldn't matter. Accountant and regulator assets are not the same as liabilities, which raises the important question -- if you want to measure asset values rather than (much simpler) liability values, then why are your asset values not the same as my liability values?

So far, then, I think the ratio of market value of equity to (equity + face value of debt) is both better and much simpler than the leverage ratio, book value of equity to complex book value of assets.

One can do better on ratios. (Equity + 1/2 market value of long-term unsecured debt ) / market value    of short term debt is attractive, as the main danger is a run on short-term debt.

Use option prices for tails. Market value of equity / face value of debt is, I think, an improvement on leverage ratios all around. But both measures have a common problem,  and I think we can do better.

A leverage (equity/assets) ratio doesn't distinguish between the riskiness of the assets. A bank facing a leverage constraint has an incentive to take on more risk. For example, you can buy a stock which costs $100, or a call option which costs $10, each having the same risk -- when the stock market moves 1%, each gains or loses $1 of value. But at a 10% leverage the stock needs $10 of capital and the call option only $1.

The main motivation of risk-weights is to try to measure assets' risk -- not the current value, but the chance of a big loss in value -- and make sure there is enough equity around for all but the worst risks. So let's try to do this with market prices.

A simple idea: So, you're worried that the same value of equity corresponds to a riskier portfolio? Fine: use option prices to measure the banks' riskiness. If bank A has bought stock worth $100, but bank B has 10 times riskier call options worth the same $100, then bank B's option prices will be much larger -- more precisely, the implied volatility of its options will be larger.

So, bottom line: Use the implied volatility of bank options to measure the riskiness of the bank's assets. As a very simple example, suppose a bank has $10 market value of equity, $90 market value of debt, and 25% implied volatility of equity. The 25% implied volatility of equity means 2.5% implied volatility of total assets, so (very roughly) the bank is four standard deviations away from wiping out its equity. Yes, this is a simplistic example, and the refinements are pretty obvious.

(For non-finance people: An option gives you the right to buy or sell a stock at a given price. The more volatile the stock, the more valuable the option. The right to sell for $80 a stock currently going at $100 is worth more, the more likely the stock is to fall below $80, i.e. the more volatile the stock. So option prices tell you the market's best guess of the chance that stocks can take a big fall.  You can recover from option prices the "implied volatility," a measure of the standard deviation of stock returns.)

We might be able to simplify even further. As a bank issues more equity and less debt, the equity gets safer and safer, and stock volatility goes down, and the implied volatility of options goes down. Perhaps it is enough to say "the implied volatility of your at the money options shall be no more than 10%."

Here's the prettiest rule I can think of. A put option is the right to sell stock at a given price. Assemble the minimum cost of put options that give the bank the right to issue stock sufficient to cover its short-term debt. For example, if the bank has $1,000 of short-term debt, then we could look at the value of 10 put options, each giving the bank the right to sell its stock at $100. If the market value of equity is greater than the cost of this set of put options, then the bank is ok.

(It would be better still if banks actually bought these put options, so they always had sitting there the right to issue equity in bad times. But then you might complain about liquidity and counterparty risk, so let's just use this as a measurement device.)

That's probably too fancy, but one should always start with the ideal before compromising. (Back to 100% equity.... )

In summary, I think we could improve a lot on the current leverage ratio by 1) using market values of equity 2) using ratios of liabilities, not accounting asset values at all and 3) using option prices to measure risk.

I left out the use of bond yields or credit default swaps to measure risk. The greater a chance of default, the higher interest rate that markets charge for debt, so one could in principle use that measure. It has been proposed as a trigger for contingent bonds or for regulatory intervention. I'm leery of it for lots of reasons. First, we're here to measure capital adequacy, so let's measure capital. Second, credit markets don't provide good measures of whether you're three or four standard deviations from default. Third, credit markets include not just the chance of default, but also the guess about recovery in default, and thus a guess about how big the bailout will be. But there is no reason in principle not to include bond information in the general picture -- so long as we can keep to the rule simple and transparent .

Our first step is to get our regulators to trust the basics: 1) stock markets provide good measures of total value -- at least better than regulators 2) option markets provide good measures of risk -- at least better than regulators.

Why not? I think our regulators and especially banks don't trust market values. They prefer the central-planning hubris that accountants and regulators can figure out what the market value and risk are better than the actual market.

If so, let's put this on the table in the open and discuss it. If the answer is "your proposal to use market value of equity and options is perfect in theory but we trust regulators to get values right a lot more than markets," then at least we have made 90% progress, and we can start examining the central question whether regulators and accountants do, in fact, outperform market measures. The question is not perfection or clairvoyance, it's whether markets or regulatory rules do a less bad job. Markets were way ahead of regulators in the last crisis.

What if market gyrations drive down the value of a bank's stock? Well, this is an important signal that bank management and regulators should take seriously by gum! Banks should have issued a lot more equity to start with to make sure this doesn't happen; banks should have issued cocos or bought put options if they think raising equity is hard. And when a bank's equity takes a tumble that is a great time to send the regulators in to see what happened. The choice act very nicely sets the equity ratio up as the point where we exempt banks from regulation, not a cliff where they get shut down.

Let's also remember, when you read the details, the leverage ratio is not all that simple or transparent either. Here is a good summary.

And let's also remember that perfection should not be the enemy of the much better. Current Basel style capital regulations are full of distorted incentives and gaming invitations. If there are small remaining imperfections, that

Or maybe not

 Is fixing the leverage ratio all important?  What's wrong with a leverage ratio? Right now, banks have to issue capital if they take your money and hold reserves at the Fed or short term Treasury debt. That obviously doesn't make much sense as it is a completely riskless activity. More subtly, a leverage ratio forces banks to issue capital against activities that are almost as safe, such as repo lending secured by Treasuries.  Required reading on these points: Darrell Duffie Financial Regulatory Reform after the crisis: An Assessment
... the regulation known as the leverage ratio has caused a distortionary reduction in the incentives for banks to intermediate markets for safe assets, especially the government securities repo market, without apparent financial stability benefits....I will suggest adjustments to the leverage ratio rule that would improve the liquidity of government securities markets and other low-risk high-importance markets, without sacrificing financial stability.
The natural response is to start risk-weighting lite. The Bank of England recently exempted government securities from their leverage ratio.  The natural response to the response is, once we start making exceptions, the lobbyists swarm in for more. You can see in Duffie's writing that an exemption for repo lending collateralized by Treasuries will come next. Given the fraction of people who understand how that works, the case for resisting more exemptions will be weak.

The poster child for the ills of risk-weighted asset regulation: Greek sovereign debt still carries no risk weight in Europe. Basel here we come.

Interestingly, Duffie does not see banks currently shifting to riskier investing, the other major concern, though that may be because the Volker rule, Basel risk weights and other constraints also apply. So perhaps I should state the market-based measures not as alternatives to the leverage rule, but as measures to add to the leverage rule, in place of the other constraints on too much risk.

But how much damage is really done by asking capital for safe investments? Recall the Modigliani-Miller theorem after all. If a bank issues equity to fund riskfree investments, the equity is pretty darn risk free too, and carries a low cost of capital.  Yes, MM doesn't hold for banks, but that's in large part because of subsidies and guarantees for debt, and it's closer to true than to totally false -- the expected return on equity does depend on that equity's risk -- and the social MM theorem is a lot closer to holding and that's what matters for policy.

And even if funneling money to safe investments costs, say, an extra percent, does that really justify the whole Dodd-Frank mess?

In the end, it is not written in stone that large, systemic, too big to fail banks must provide intermediation to safe investments. A money market fund can take your deposits and turn them in to reserves, needing no equity at all. A bank could sponsor such a fund, run your deposits through that fund, and you'd never notice the difference until the moment the bank goes under... and your fund is intact.

Duffle again:
These resiliency reforms, particularly bank capital regulations, have caused some reduction in secondary market liquidity. While bid-ask spreads and most other standard liquidity metrics suggest that markets are about as liquid for small trades as they have been for a long time, liquidity is worse for block-sized trade demands. As a trade-off for significantly greater financial stability, this is a cost well worth bearing. Meanwhile, markets are continuing to slowly adapt to the reduction of balance sheet space being made available for market-making by bank-affiliated dealers. [my emphasis] Even more stringent minimum requirements for capital relative to risk-weighted assets would, in my view, offer additional net social benefits. 
I emphasized the important sentence here. There are many other ways to funnel risk free money to risk free lending activities. The usual mistake in financial policy is to presume that the current big banks must always remain, and must always keep the same scope of their current activities -- and that new banks, or new institutions, cannot arise when profitable businesses like intermediation open up.

So, in the worst case that a liquidity ratio makes it too expensive for banks to funnel deposits to reserves, to fund market-making or repo lending, then all of those activities can move outside of big banks.

More Choice act

The Choice act has some additional very interesting characteristics.

Most of all, it offers a carrot instead of a stick: Banks with sufficient equity are exempt from a swath of regulation.

That carrot is very clever. We don't have to repeal and replace Dodd-Frank it its entirety, and we don't have to force the big banks to utterly restructure things overnight. Want to go on hugely leveraged? The regulators will be back in Monday morning. Would you rather be free to do things as you see fit and not spend all week filling out forms? Then stop whining, issue some equity or cut dividends for a while.

More deeply, it offers a path for new financial institutions to enter and compete. Compliance costs and a compliance department are not only a drag on existing businesses, they are a huge barrier to entry. Are markets illiquid? Are there people who can't get loans? The answer, usually forgotten in policy, is not to prod existing businesses but to allow new ones to enter. A new pathway -- lots of capital in return for less asset-risk regulation -- will allow that to happen.

Both politically and economically, it is much easier to let Dodd-Frank die on the vine than to uproot and replant it.

In the department of finish sanding, I would also suggest a good deal more than 10% equity.   I also would prefer a stairstep -- 10% buys exemption from x (maybe SIFI), 20% buys you exemption from y, and so forth, until at maybe 80% equity + long term debt you're not even a "bank" any more.

Remember, the issue is runs, not failure. Banks should fail, equity wiped out, and long-term debt becomes equity. The point of regulation is not to make sure banks are "safe" and "don't fail." The point of regulation is to stop runs and crises. So ratios that emphasize short term debt are the most important ones.

Duffle (above) also comes down on the side of more capital still. The "Minneapolis plan" spearheaded by Minneapolis Fed President Neel Kashkari (Speechreport by James Pethokoukis at AEI) envisions even more capital, up to 38%.

Central Bank Governance Meeting

I'll be part of "Central Bank Governance and Oversight Reform: A Panel Discussion" at the Hoover Institution Washington DC offices, Tuesday Dec 6, 2016 10:00-12:00. The panelists will be  Michael Bordo, John Cochrane, Charles Plosser, John Taylor, and Kevin Warsh.

The occasion will be in honor of the book (cover at left), though knowing this panel I doubt we will keep to the subject and instead enjoy a thorough debate on central bank and monetary policy issues. The format will be very short presentations, followed by lively Q&A and discussion.

If you're interested in attending, follow this link to rsvp.


Update
Discussion now available online, embed below, link here

FCA Behavioural Experiments Paper

The UK Financial Conduct Authority has released several papers over the last three years on the use of behavioural economics in policy (I would particularly recommend their first paper on this for a very useful overview of behavioural economics)e. Their latest paper is available here (summary below). It summarises a range of experimental evidence from trials they have conducted on behavioural aspects of retail financial markets in the UK. The publication of such a range of experiments, many of which do not find evidence for the effects tested, is very welcome and a further step toward what a mature use of behavioural evidence in public policy should look like. It is also particularly welcome to see a body such as the FCA cite the work of scholars such as Nancy Carthwright and Angus Deaton in calling for a more contextualised integration of randomised trial and other types of evidence into public policy. The usefulness of behavioural interventions in financial regulation is still wide open for debate, in particular the optimal mix of hard and soft interventions in regulating markets with high degrees of confusion and potential for exploitation. 
Summary 
The FCA has been at the forefront of using behavioural science and experiments to inform regulation. Since our first field trial on customer compensation in 2013, we have published the results of experimental research in a number of consumer markets including savings accounts and structured savings products, along with car and home insurance. 
This round-up paper presents a further eight experiments, comprising five field trials and three online experiments, which test the effect of interventions that draw on behavioural theory, such as increasing salience or personalisation.   
We investigate diverse questions including:
How can we design disclosure about annuities to help people get a better deal?
How can firms improve customers’ engagement with their mortgages?
What messages encourage customers to claim compensation?
How can compliance and engagement amongst regulated firms be improved using communications? 
While some experiments corroborate existing research or find interesting effects, others did not find any statistically significant effects. We are publishing these results, including non-significant and negative results, in the spirit of good research so that we can improve evidence, combat publication bias and make our research transparent. We also share some of the practical lessons we have learned, in the hope that others may benefit from them.   
Authors
Laura Smart
The author works in the Behavioural Economics and Data Science Unit in the Strategy and Competition division of the FCA.
Researchers
Paul Adams, Matteo Aquilina, Robert Baker, Will Brambley, Alessandro Nava, Sumedha Pathak, James Ridgewell, Helena Robertson, James Shafe, Laura Smart, Dom Suckling, Roisin Wilson and Qamar Zaman.

Exceptionalism

For Thanksgiving, I offer a rumination.

Last month, the Hoover Institution's fall retreat was organized around the theme of American Exceptionalism. See here for podcasts of talks from the stars -- really good. I talked about the nexus between economics, rule of law, regulation, and exceptionalism.

This was before the election, but two themes strike me as especially important still.

First: America needs rule of law, regular order, a partisan truce, even more than it needs my particular free-market policy preferences.

If Republicans overturn Obamacare in their first 100 days, with no Democratic votes; if President Trump picks up his phone and pen, undoes 8 years of Obama in the first day, and starts writing his own; and sends the agencies after his critics and enemies, we are headed for disaster.  Future president Elizabeth Warren, or President Malia Obama with Vice President Chelsea Clinton, will just do the same. There is an anectdotal story of early 20th century Chicago mayors, who alternated between German and Irish. Each one's first act in office would be to overturn the ban on whiskey (beer), and impose a ban on beer (whiskey). (Too good a story to check the facts!) Let's not do that.

Second, we must not become a country where you can't afford to lose an election. The criminalization of politics has already gone too far. If you can't afford to lose an election -- if losing or supporting the losing party or speaking out on policy issues that lose gains you the tender attentions of the FBI, the IRS, the DOJ, the NLRB, and the EPA, if you lose your job and your business -- then people in power will fight to the end not to lose that power. Though I'm no fan of the Clinton foundation shenanigans, the noises coming out of the Trump transition not to push that issue are hopeful. Losing an election, a 95% reduction in speaking fees, and the public attention that investigative journalists can bring are enough. Putin can't retire and stay out of jail -- or alive.

A last thought for Thanksgiving. The Pilgrims were all illegal immigrants -- violating their charter from the English King, and the natives' longstanding ban on white settlement. Thank the Wampanoag's tolerant attitude for your turkey.


Economics, Rule of Law, and American Exceptionalism
(Talk given at Hoover retreat October 2016) 

To be a conservative — or, in my case an empirical, pax-americana, rule-of-law, constitutionalist conservative libertarian — is pretty much by definition to believe that America is “exceptional” — and that she is perpetually in danger of losing that precious characteristic. Exceptionalism is not natural or inborn, but must be understood, cherished, maintained, and renewed each generation — and her garden is always perilously unattended.


Like every word describing beliefs, however, “exceptionalism” is a slippery concept. America’s detractors often use the same word pejoratively and derisively. To them, exceptionalism means a parochial and ignorant moral superiority. We are not the first or only society to see itself as exceptional, different, or somehow better than everyone else.

The promise

So why is America exceptional, in the good sense? Here, I think, economics provides a crucial answer. The ideas that American exceptionalism propounds have led to the most dramatic improvement in widely-shared human well being, shared widely,  in human history. That improvement is not just material, but health, lifespan, peace and any measure of human prosperity. Yes, despite the horrors we read from the world’s war zones and some of our own cities, violence remains on a steady decline.

Aesop tells of a hungry wolf, who meets and admires a well-fed dog. But the wolf sees the dog’s collar, he says, no thanks, and walks off. Fortunately, we do not face the wolf’s conundrum. We do not have to argue for a moral superiority of freedom, and ask for material sacrifice. The wolf is both well-fed and free.

Despite the promises of monarchs, autocrats, dictators, commissars, central planners, socialists, industrial policy-makers, progressive nudgers and assorted dirigistes, it is liberty and rule of law that has led to this enormous progress. To the Chinese argument, say, that their ancient culture demands authoritarianism, a simple reply suffices: You, $7,000 per capita GDP, and filthy air. Us: $52,000 per capita and a clean environment.

I do not think this outcome was intentional. Neither our founders, nor those that built the British institutions which the founders improved, had any idea of the material progress their invention would  father, nor that the US would rise to lead the world to a 70 year pax Americana. Jefferson envisioned a bucolic agrarian society. Washington warned against foreign entaglements. A system designed only to defend individual liberty unintentionally unleashed unimaginable material and international benefits.

Of course, the foundations of this prosperity, in rule of law, security of property, internal peace, are not ours alone. America was built on British institutions, and the industrial revolution started there. Other countries have adopted many of these institutions, and joined in prosperity to the extent that they do so.

Without this economic success, I doubt that anyone would call America exceptional. Imagine that China were 7 times as productive per capita as we are, rather than the other way around. Or, imagine that great natural experiment, North Korea vs. South Korea. North Korea also claims to be exceptional. The rest of the world regards it as an exceptional basket case.

Of course, the foundations of this prosperity, in rule of law, security of property, internal peace, are not ours alone. America was built on British institutions. Other countries have adopted many of our institutions, and joined in our prosperity to the extent that they do so.

In fact, the core of exceptionalist faith describes its own undoing. If American values are indeed universal, if America’s exceptional role is to bring these ideas to the world, then when the world does adopt those ideas, America must become somewhat less exceptional.

America is already less unusual than it was at its founding, and through the eras of monarchies, of great dictators, and of soviet communism, when America’s detractors insisted she would be just one more short-lived republic.

But the process is far from over. The U.S. remains the essential, exceptional, nation

All the great ideas for the next advances in human well-being are being made here. Computers and the internet, biotech, genetics, the microbiome. Most importantly, the great ideas are being implemented here - the new companies are American.

More darkly, any hope for resolving the world’s gathering storm clouds reside in the U.S. If we don’t get our act together and revive our exceptionalism, and pretty darn soon, the consequences are truly terrifying.

Chaos in the middle east, more swarms of refugees. Russian and Chinese forcible expansion. Nuclear weapons going off here and there.  Pandemics of people, animals, or crops, which often follow waves of globalization.

The troops in the first Iraq war wore T-shirts saying “who you gonna call? 001.” It’s still the only number.

Enough self-congratulation. It’s time to move on to the second item of a conservative’s faith, that it’s all in danger of falling apart. And it is, more than ever.

The rule of law

I locate the core source of America’s exceptional nature in our legal system — the nexus of constitutional government, artfully created with checks and balances, and rule of law that guides our affairs. And that is also where I locate the greatest danger at the moment.

Lawyers? Government? You chuckle. That you may laugh just tells us how endangered this precious flower is. Without rule of law, any American character for innovation is quickly squashed.

Rule of law means the rights of the accused to know charges against them, to see evidence, to confront witnesses; the right of free speech and especially unwelcome political speech; the separation of prosecution and judges; grand juries to weigh evidence, and warrants for searches; the right to property, what that right means, and courts that will defend it (Fracking developed in the US pretty much because property rights include subsoil minerals, which are retained by the government in most other countries.); the delicate constitutional checks and balances that keep majorities from running amok, and delay awful ideas until enthusiasm passes; a free press, that can expose corruption. And so on ad infinitum.

Even democracy only lives on top of rule of law. We are a republic, not a democracy, and for good reasons. Democracy is a fundamentally a check on tyranny, not a good way to run day to day public affairs. Democracy without rule of law produces neither prosperity nor freedom. Even countries like Venezuela and Russia go through the motions of elections, but you can’t get a building permit without connections or speak out against the government without losing your job. Rule of law without democracy can function for a time and  tends to produce democracy. America lived for 150 years under rule of law while still a monarchy.

And without rule of law, democracy is soon subverted. Those in government are always tempted to use the government’s power to silence opposition and cement their hold on power, and ruin the economy in the process. That’s our danger. If speaking out for a candidate, a policy question such as climate change, or working on behalf of a losing party earns you the tender attentions of the SEC, IRS, EPA, CFPB, NLRB, and increasingly the DOJ and FBI, it does not matter who votes.

Erosion of rule of law

The erosion of rule of law is all around us. I see it most strongly in the explosion of the administrative, regulatory state. Most of the “laws” we face are not, in fact, laws, written by a legislature and signed by an executive as we are taught in school. They are regulations, promulgated by agencies.


This made sense, initially. For example, it does not make sense for Congress to write the criteria for maintaining an airliner. But now that system has spiraled out of control. The ACA and Dodd-Frank acts are poster children. Their enabling acts go on for thousands of pages. The subsidiary regulations go on for tens of thousands. The letters and statements of interpretation and guidance, now essentially laws of their own, go on for more.

Were these even rules that one can read and comply with, it wouldn’t be so bad. But the real problem is that rules are so vague and complex that nobody knows what they really mean.

Companies can’t just read the rules. They must ask for regulator approval ahead of time, which can take years, and gives arbitrary results.

Hence, the “rules” really just mean discretion for the regulators to do what they want — or to coerce behavior they wish out of companies by the threat of an arbitrary and adverse decision. Anyone can be found guilty at any time — if the regulator chooses to single them out, as an EPA administrator once said, for “crucifixion.”

Richard Epstein calls the system “government by waiver.” The law and regulations are impossible to comply with. So business after business asks for waivers. Which are granted, mostly. But you’d be out of your head to object too loudly to the actions of the agency or the administration it serves if you want a waiver.

On top of laws, rules, and judicial interpretations, now agencies write “guidance” letters to state their interpretation of a rule, which become laws of their own.

Like laws, new regulations are supposed to follow a procedure. They are supposed to respect and implement Congress’ authorizing legislation, incorporate public comment, serious cost benefit analysis, and so forth. But even these weak constraints are less and less binding.

Obamacare subsides. FTC internet regulation. The EPA taking on carbon and closing down coal. Keystone. The education department war on private colleges. All of these step far outside the established limits. (My point is not the merits of any of these, which may be fine regulations. My point is the lack of rule-of-law process in how they were promulgated)

The basic rights that citizens are supposed to have in face of the law are also vanishing in the regulatory state. The agency is prosecutor, judge, jury, appeal court, executioner, and recipient of fine money all rolled in to one.  You do not have conventional rights to see evidence and calculations, discover information, and challenge witnesses. Agencies change their interpretation of the law, and come after their victims ex post.

Retroactive decisions are common, never mind the constitutional prohibition on bills of attainder. When the DOJ and CFPB went after auto lenders, based on a statistical analysis of last names of people who had received auto loans, the computer program was obviously not announced ahead of time, so businesses had any idea if they were following the law. The CFPB went after PHH, a mortgage lender, issuing a novel interpretation of the law, charging the PHH ex-post with violation of that new interpretation, and increasing its own administrative Judge’s $6 million dollar fine to $109 million.

The expansion of the regulatory state, and disappearance of rule of law in its operation is already having its economic impact. The long-term growth rate of the US economy has been cut in half, driven largely by anemic investment.

I fear even more the political impact. The point of rule of law is to keep government from using law for political purposes. As we lose rule of law in the regulatory state, its politicization is inevitable. IRS and Lois Lerner. Campaign finance law and Gov. Scott Walker.

The drive towards criminalized regulatory witch hunts and going after the executives means one thing: those executives had better make sure their organizations stay in line.

ITT tech got closed down as part of the Administration’s war on for-profit education. Laureate International Universities, the for-profit college that coincidentally paid Bill Clinton $17.6 million as “honorary chancellor,” did not.

The SEC is piling on ambitious state attorney generals drive to sue Exxon, under securities law, for insufficient piety over climate change.

Big “settlements” with banks, are leading to millions of dollars channeled to left-wing and Democratic party political advocacy groups.

The classic analysis of regulation says it leads to capture: the industry captures the regulator, they get cozy, and regulation ends up being used to stifle competition in the industry. Capture is now going the other way. Health insurers, banks, energy companies are slowly being captured by the politicized regulators. Yes, they still get protection, but they must do the regulator and administration’s political bidding. And a constant stream of CEO show trials and criminal investigations keeps them in line. With calls for more. Just imagine what they could do with lists of donors to out-of-power party PAC and nonprofits.

Campaign finance law is precisely about regulating speech, and the government taking over who can support whom in an election. Corporations will be forced to disclose contributions. Unions will not.

In the classic story, industry captures the regulator, they get cozy, and regulation ends up being used to stifle competition in the industry. Capture is now going the other way. Industries are slowly being captured by the politicized regulators. Yes, they still get protection, but they must do the regulator and administration’s political bidding. And a constant stream of CEO show trials and criminal investigations keeps them in line.

The key attribute that makes America exceptional — and prosperous — is that you can afford to lose an election.  Grumble, sit back, regroup and try again next time. You won’t lose your job, or your business. You won’t suddenly find trouble getting permits and approvals. You won’t have alphabet soup agents at your door. You won’t have prosecutions of your political associations.

In many countries, people can’t afford to lose elections. Those in power do not give it up easily. Those out of power are reduced to violence.

We are losing that attribute. American exceptionalism does not mean that all the bad things that happen elsewhere in the world cannot happen here.

Perhaps I am guilty of nostalgia, but I sense that once upon a time, those in American public life believed that their first duty was to keep alive the beautiful structure of American government, and the policy passion of the day came second and within that constraint.

We are suffering now a devotion to outcome, to winning the momentary battle at any cost. Legislation that passes by one vote? Fine. Regulations written far past enabling authority? Go for it. Executive order in place of law or regulation? Do it. Just write a letter of interpretation to tell them what to do. Shove it down their throats. But when policies are adopted without at least grudging consensus that the battle was fairly won, you can’t afford to lose an election.

Since the Nixon impeachment, and with the spread of campaign finance law and regulation, we are seeing a greater and greater “criminalization of politics.” It’s part of using any tool to win. But it adds to America’s central exception to human affairs, that you can afford to lose an election.

Our public life depends on voluntary cooperation. Administrations follow the law, even when they don’t really have to. They defer to court and supreme court decisions which they could ignore. The president does have a pen and a phone — and the number at DOJ and FBI and IRS. The rule of law depends on him or her not using it.  We do not ask the question too deeply “so what are you going to do about it?” We are losing that respect for the system.

The idea of rule of law, the reverence for process over outcome seems to be disappearing. Few college seniors will have any idea what we’re talking about. Even basic civics courses are passé. And we see so much on both sides of the partisan divide that ignores it. Our many foreign-policy misadventures have a common theme, forgetting that all societies need rule-of-law foundations not just the superficial exercise of voting.

Rule of law, then, depends on a culture that respects it, not just the written word. And that culture depends on people to some extent understanding how it works. Like medieval peasants, having lost the recipe, looking up in marvel at Roman concrete structures, I fear our children will wonder just how the architecture of a broken system once worked its marvels. And the Romans lasted 1000 years. Pax Americana seems to be running out of steam at a mere 250.

Egalitarianism and the pursuit of happiness.

Our government’s purpose is set forth in the Declaration of Independence: to secure Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness, period. Government does not exist to lead us to some grander purpose: the advancement of the Christian faith, or the restoration of the Caliphate; the spread of communism on earth; the greatness of our kultur, or the glorious American Nation. When Kennedy said “ask not what your country can do for you — ask what you can do for your country” he had it precisely wrong.

Yes, American Exceptionalists wish to spread their ideas to the world, but not to subjugate those people to some greater cause — merely to allow them to pursue Life, Liberty and Happiness as those people see it.

A central article of exceptionalist faith is that American institutions are universal. We deny that they are specific to a culture or (heavens) race. People everywhere want freedom, and can learn to use American institutions to get it as quickly as they can learn to use an American iPhone to order American Pizza. (Sorry Italy!)

Most of all, government does not exist to further the ethnic or religious identity of a people. Throughout the world, governments parcel up the spoils of power along ethnic and religious lines. Each losing ethnic or religious group then needs its own government to defend its simple economic and expressive rights. Multi-cultural and multi-ethnic empires existed before. But by and large they were empires of tolerance, not right, and extracted resources from citizens equally rather than served them equally.

In the US, the children of Serbians and Croatians, of Indians and Pakistanis, of Catholics and Protestants and Muslims and Jews, live side by side and intermarry. None imagine that they needed a government run by one of their own ethnic group or religion for basics like getting a business permit. The idea that government serves to foster their ethnic or religious identity becomes quickly foreign. Yes, this melting pot ideal has never been perfect, but it holds much more than in any other country.

But how quaint this melting pot view seems now!

Interestingly, that ideal it disappeared first from our foreign policy. For a hundred years, the U.S. has stood behind ethnic or religious governments, happily playing one against the other, and not once saying “you know, we have a better idea for managing this, one where you won’t be at each other’s throats for another century or so.”

But that exceptional ideal is now vanishing domestically as well. Our government requires us to fill out forms with fine racial categorizations. The core principle, that to be treated fairly by the law, you  do not need to be represented by a police officer, mayor, congressman, senator, or president of your own particular racial, ethnic or religious identity is not not only fading away, but its opposite is enshrined in law.

It is true that these measures stemmed from the overturning of the even more egregious violation of American principles in laws governing African Americans, not only in the Jim Crow south but the segregated north as well. But at least we paid lip service to the principle.

A country that believes, and enshrines in law, the principle — opposed to everything in American exceptionalism — that you cannot be treated fairly by a government unless the officials of that government share your exact racial, ethnic, religious, and soon gender identity, will soon fracture.

Similarly, exceptional America does not recognize the concept of “class.” Our disavowal of aristocracy and titles set us distinctly apart from Britain in the 19th century. And yet we now use that language all the time — “middle class” or “working class” especially. Economic law, regulation, and policy, increasingly treats income as a permanent class designator, as fine and permanent as Indian castes, and treats its citizens on that basis every bit as much as monarchic England treated peasant differently from nobility. We decry the reduction in mixing in America, yet when housing, food, medicine and so on are distributed based on income, income becomes a permanent class marker.

Opportunity is a key part of the egalitarian credo. But a society divvied up by formal categories of class, race, and income quickly loses that opportunity. As with economic regulation though, each such division is a client usefully exploited for political advantage. Exceptional America foreswore the opportunistic politics of such divisions.

Don't get me wrong. Identity is important. Contemporary America is one of the most tolerant societies on earth, and if people want to use their liberty to explore their national, enthic, gender, religious, class or other identities, more power to them. But eventually, once the egregious persecutions of law have passed, we must aim to keep identity out of politics, especially presidential politics, and especially the ethnic and religious identities that are the organizing principle for conflict around the globe, and into culture and religious and community organizations where it belongs.

Fixing it

The third article in exceptionalist faith, however, is optimism; that despite the ever-gathering clouds, America will once again face the challenge and reform. There is a reason that lovers of liberty tend to be Chicago Cubs fans. (And, as a member of both tribes, I take hope from one for the other!)

Healing is not something we should take for granted, however. There is no automatic self-correcting force. Every scrape with disaster is a scrape with disaster. It can happen here. Hope is not a strategy.

The recipe is straightforward. Rather than just demand “less regulation” even louder, we need to bring rule-of-law process and protections to the regulatory state, and revive them in our legal procedures as well. It’s time to pay attention to the structure of government rather than on its outcome.

Congress should re-structure the law surrounding regulation. Stop writing 1000 page page bills. Strengthen the Administrative procedures act describing how regulations are written and implemented. Require serious, and retrospective, cost benefit analysis. Put in “shot clocks,” time limits for regulatory decisions. Give people more avenues to challenge regulation in a timely manner.

Good news: people on both sides of the partisan divide recognize this fact. The “better way” Ryan plan contains just this kind of radical restructuring of the regulatory process. It goes so far as to require that Congress must approve new major regulations — a large change in the balance of power back to Congress and away from Administration and Agencies.  The Obama administration tried to strengthen the OIRA (office of information and regulatory affairs)  its office of regulatory affairs, to regulation. The effort failed, but it signals a bipartisan realization that the regulatory state is broken and taught some useful lessons.

The court system plays a crucial role..  Fix the court system so you’re not bankrupt and dead by the time you win. The litmus test for new judges should be their willingness to sustain rule-of-law restrictions on the regulatory state, not to re-fight social issues. Let the litmus test be Wickard v. Filburn, which declared a man may not grow wheat in his own yard to make his own bread without a Federal Wheat Marketing Order,  not Roe v. Wade.

A small comment on foreign policy

I have focused on economics, but nowhere is the decline of American exceptionalism more evident than in foreign policy. Post world war II pax Americana has been the most peaceful and prosperous period in all human history. But its development and success has been one narrow scrape after another, and any of them could have gone wrong. The next one may.

What country can look at the experience of Ukraine — to which the United States guaranteed territorial integrity in exchange for giving up nuclear weapons — North Korea, India, Pakistan, Libya, and Iran and not conclude that getting nuclear weapons and rattling them is a darn good idea?

Teddy Roosevelt said to speak softly and to carry a big stick. America these days speaks loudly, aimed at the daily polls, doesn’t mean it, and announces ahead of time that it won’t use its stick. Eisenhower did not tell Hitler ahead of time how many troops he was going to put in at Normandy, and how quickly he would take them out. The answer was, enough to win, period.

The Bush administration gave the project of bringing democracy to the world a bad name, in part by misunderstanding just how much rule of law must underpin democracy, and in part by misundnerstanding just how much the world still needs the idea and culture of rule of law.
For a messianic, universalist, religion, we do precious little missionary work these days.

A small thought for those anxious for America to retreat from its "exceptional"  leadership role and allies to pay more and be more active: He who picks up the check gets to pick the restaurant.

Hope

It is common to bemoan the state of American politics. But we should be optimistic. The major parties are blowing up. We are in a once-in-a-generation major realignment and redefinition. Only a big realignment can produce the rule-of-law and free-market coalition that I describe here. Power may shift from the once imperial presidency to an emboldened Congress. Only a time of big change offers big opportunity.

Finally, ideas matter. An exceptional — and functional — America must understand how she is supposed to work. We are a democracy, and if voters don’t respond with elemental understanding of their rights, and outrage when those rights are violated, as the founders did, we can’t expect miracle politicians to save us.

How do we expect our children to understand the machinery if we don’t tell them? The schools and universities don’t do that any more. But others institutions do!

You’re sitting in an exceptionally American institution, a reservoir of, as our banner says “ideas defining freedom.” Sometimes that reservoir is an ark, keeping ideas alive in a dark age. Sometimes it is a fountain, ready to bring those ideas to the world when it’s ready. But you, me, and the institutions we form — another brilliantly exceptional American habit — are crucial to her renewal.