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A survey



My Hoover colleague David Brady put together this lovely graph, using the Gallup poll results from their standard question, "do you think the economy is getting better?"

It has many interesting interpretations -- add your own in comments.

A context that spiked my interest is the use of survey data for expectations in economics. We frequently use such surveys to establish what expectations are, or to question whether expectations are rational.  That partisan feeling so dramatically affects people's views of the economy is  interesting for the interpretation of such survey results.

Most economists don't think that presidential elections have all that much to do with the state of the economy, at least within the bounds of what traditional Republicans and Democrats actually end up doing when in power. The people, apparently, believe quite differently, or at least this time.

Temporary Role Qualitative Research Assistance

Research Assistant Needed for Qualitative Research

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The successful candidate will provide research support, deliverables and project work to Dr Slawa Rokicki on a research project in the field of adolescent reproductive health in Sub-Saharan Africa. The project involves analysing 32 qualitative in-depth interviews about sexual behaviour and contraceptive use conducted with young women in Ghana. The main tasks will include coding of qualitative interview data and literature review.

Pay: €10.55 per hour

Please send applications and CV’s to Dr Slawa Rokicki, slawa.rokicki@ucd.ie
Closing Date: Monday, 12th June 2017 at 17:00
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Geary Institute for Public Policy

University College Dublin

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Single payer food?

I heard a revealing conversation on NPR Weekend Edition Saturday, featuring Scott Simon, the usually soothing and empathetic Cubs-fan voice of my Saturday mornings, and  Nebraska Congressman Adrian Smith.
SIMON: This budget would also... mean deep cuts to the food stamp program....
After some waffling about farm subsidies,
SIMON: Well, let me ask you this bluntly - is every American entitled to eat? 
SMITH: Well, they - nutrition, obviously, we know is very important. And I would hope that we can look to... 
SIMON: Well, not just important, it's essential for life. Is every American entitled to eat? 
SMITH: It is essential. It is essential. 
SIMON: So is every American entitled to eat, and is food stamps something that ought to be that ultimate guarantor? 
SMITH: I think that we know that, given the necessity of nutrition, there could be a number of ways that we could address that. 
SIMON: So you would vote ..  for a budget that cuts food stamps? 
SMITH: I want to look at an entire budget, look at all of the details. I'm still sifting through the details of the newly released budget. But we know that Congress ultimately has the say. I look for there to be a lot of changes made in the House and the Senate to the president's budget. 
SIMON: Congressman Adrian Smith from Nebraska, thanks so much for being with us, sir. 
SMITH: Thank you. Have a good day.
[My emphasis.]

It really speaks for itself and I should just stop here. But as this is a blog, let me expand on the obvious.


Notice the progressive-passive voice. "Is every American entitled to eat?" Just who does what to whom?

The direct answer to the question, as posed, is, "Yes. Every American is entitled to eat. And on just what planet do you live that you think there are laws prohibiting Americans from eating?"

Since the question as posed is nonsense, we know it must have a hidden meaning. The hidden subject of the sentence, is  given the food-stamp context, the federal government. What Scott means is, "Is every American entitled to have the Federal government tax other citizens to pay for his or her food?"

Stop and savor the power of the subject-free sentence, the difference between the stated question and its real meaning.

Even to that one the answer has to be no. There is no such law, right, or entitlement. That is a simple matter of fact. Scott knows that too. So, what Scott really means is, "Don't you think the Federal government should establish an entitlement that every American can have the Federal government pay for his or her food, from funds raised by taxation?"

On the third time, he almost actually said what he meant, with "is food stamps something that ought to be that ultimate guarantor?" Though "food stamps" is a pretty wimpy subject of a sentence. "Should the federal taxpayer be the ultimate guarantor through the food stamp program" is more accurate.

Obviously, Simon knows this -- that we're talking about a taxpayer funded federal program, not an abstract right to eat. (That in response to some comments.) But that just makes it worse, because it is then deliberate. Or perhaps so deliberately repeated that the obfuscation of subject is unconscious.

Then there is the "to eat." Death by involuntary starvation is essentially unknown in the US today.

There is a nutrition problem -- obesity and type 2 diabetes.  There is a real money issue behind that nutrition problem -- if takes money and time to avoid sugar and high fructose corn syrup. And food stamps (SNAP really) are poorly structured, as they pay equally for bad food as for good food. They are as much if not more agricultural subsidies than actually making it possible for people "to eat." Scott said so:
SIMON: ... Doesn't it also, the food stamp program, also help farmers who produce the food that's bought?
"Farmers" means large agribusiness.  Scott did not ask a second time here, when the Congressman dissembled, and it would have been fun had he done so. "Oh you Republicans pretend to be free-market, and here you are defending farm subsidies."  But he didn't ask a second time here. And lest you think me unfeeling, I actually support targeted nutrition programs, focusing on better food. Feeding subsidized sugar to schoolchildren is unproductive in a hundred ways.

But "to eat" is another Orwellian substitution. Scott not only hides the agency behind his question, he substitutes the specter of hunger, of starvation -- are Americans entitled to eat -- for a serious issue.

We're talking here only about undoing some of the recent expansion of food stamps. 40 million Americans receive food stamps. Really, in 2007, were there millions of starving people walking the streets of America, begging for handouts to hold off the grim reaper, before the Obama administration expanded SNAP?

Scott is substituting a moral argument -- yes, we do not let people starve -- for an unrelated political one -- should the Federal Government subsidize 40 million people's food purchases and a bunch of agribusinesses' sales.

A colleague sent me this a while ago, from Dave Burge, "the funniest man on Twitter," which pretty much sums up Scott's argument:
"To help poor children, I am going to launch flaming accordions into the Grand Canyon." 
"That's stupid." 
"WHY DO YOU HATE POOR CHILDREN?" 
Scott reveals deeply the deliberate confusion among "progressives," between your right to do something, to purchase a good or service from another, and an "entitlement" to have the Federal government pay for it by taxing others. No, you do not lose "access" to something just because you have to earn the money to pay for it. But by deliberately confusing the issue, and repeating the mantra over and over, they can ride the moral authority of the former to the illogical conclusion of the latter.

It is rare for a news interviewer to persist with a question, and three times rarer still. Usually the routine is, ask question, politician ducks, move on. As Scott did earlier on agricultural subsides, where he really could have caught the Congressman. By asking three times, Scott reveals he thinks this really is a  zinger, the "aha, so just when did you stop passing secrets to the Russians?" sort of question every reporter dreams of.

I felt for the poor Congressman -- this is just the sort of interview where I kick myself on the way home for reacting too much to the polite voice and not quickly enough jumping to battle with the blinding idiocy in front of me.

NPR wonders why people view it as an intensely partisan politicized organization, the government-subsized (through the charitable donation tax exclusion as well as directly) Fox News of the left. When it's this deeply ingrained, you probably can't see it. Single-payer food is apparently so taken for granted around the NPR studios, that this seems like a scoop. At least Scott interviewed a Republican, something NPR seems to do less and less of lately. But perhaps it's hard to get people to submit to this sort of thing.

Launch those flaming accordions.

Update: In case it wasn't clear, this post is about language not policy. SNAP may be great. SNAP may be a colossal waste of money and a subsidy to big agriculture. The point is about the argument for SNAP that "every American is entitled to eat." Even good policies can be supported by terrible arguments.

Update 2: I would be a lot more for SNAP if it didn't pay for ridiculously unhealthy food. OK, I'm a libertarian, gorge yourself on high fructose corn syrup if you want -- but not on my dime. Ok, actually, I'm paying for your diabetes, so maybe not even that.

Update 3: Dana Milbank at the Washington Post, approves of Simon's great gotcha scoop, and does him one better, writing,
That exchange should put in perspective the real and present danger Trump poses...But taking away Americans’ food is very tangible, and a real possibility.
So now reducing or reforming SNAP is Trump taking away American's food. He swoopeth down from above and graphs the hamburger out of starving children's hands.


Update 4: Readers coming here from Noah Smith's health care rant, see here for a response.

YIMBY papers

Two new papers on housing restrictions are noteworthy, Housing Constraints and Spatial Misallocation by Chang-Tai Hsieh and Enrico Moretti, and  The Economic Implications of Housing Supply by Ed Glaeser and Joe Gyourko.

Readers of this blog will not be surprised at the idea that zoning and other restrictions drive up the cost of housing, and that this has many bad consequences on economic growth and inequality. The papers are especially noteworthy for much deeper implications.

Hsieh and Moretti:
...high productivity cities like New York and the San Francisco Bay Area have adopted stringent re- strictions to new housing supply, effectively limiting the number of workers who have access to such high productivity. Using a spatial equilibrium model and data from 220 metropolitan areas we find that these constraints lowered aggregate US growth by more than 50% from 1964 to 2009.
1) The costs of regulation. The biggest problem in economics right now (yes, I mean that) is, How do we measure the growth consequences of regulation? Looking at the Western world's sclerotically slow growth rate, and listening to many anecdotes, it seems at least plausible that productive innovation is being strangled by byzantine bureacracy, captured by rent-seeking and anti-competitive forces. (Your other choices are, we just ran out of ideas, or some sort of endless "lack of demand.")

But how do we move past anecdote? How to we come up with "regulation is costing the economy x percentage points of growth?" Our statistical measurement system, GDP, unemployment, inflation, and so on, was beautifully designed in the 1940s to measure very Keynesian demand concepts. It isn't designed to answer the question of our time, how much growth is regulation costing us? We are flying in the dark. And Europe, perpetually in an Augustinian moment -- Lord,  grant me structural reform, just not yet--is also.

Well, Hsieh and Moretti are doing it, and by doing so showing one path to answering the larger question.

Half of all US growth for a half century is an astounding amount. 1964: $3,734 trillion;   2009: $14,419 Trillion. Growth = 3.05% per year. At 6.1% per year, $3734 x (1.061)^(2009-1964)=$53.6 trillion dollars!

OK, maybe that's too huge. Well, read the paper and see how they came up with the number. If you don't like their assumptions make different ones. More important than this number is how they are coming up with answers to this, the most important question of economics.

2) Models and micro vs. macro

So how do they make the calculation? Roughly, they measure productivity in cities. They assume that people get higher wages in San Francisco because there are some very high productivity activities that have to be done here. They assume that business could expand and form here, and workers could move here and join in those high productivity activities, both earning higher wages and making more and better stuff for the rest of us. But those workers can't move, and businesses can't expand and form, because housing supply is restricted.

You can see grounds for objection.


Housing costs are high in places like Carmel (I think) because retired rich people like to live there, together with restricted supply -- the amenity theory of housing cost. Workers moving there would not earn a lot more. Maybe people live in tiny apartments in San Francisco because they prefer it, so restricted housing supply is not restricting productive activity. Well come up with your own model, and check it out in the micro data as Hsieh and Moretti do. Every model has assumptions. To calculate a counterfactual -- how much would people earn and businesses make if they could move to San Francisco -- you have to do that. It takes a better model to beat a model.

But there is a deep lesson in their style of modeling: Heterogeneity. Misallocation. Dispersion. Inequality. The key lesson is not that "regulation is killing US firms on average." The US as a whole is doing badly because firms are in the wrong place -- misallocation. Each individual firm may feel it's doing fine. It might consider moving to San Francisco, but say "well, we might be more productive there, but wages are much higher because you have to pay people enough to buy a house, so we wouldn't make any more money if we were there." More to the point, a new business that would embody the higher productivity, get workers to move, and put the old unproductive business out of business can't start.

Macroeconomics and our numbers are designed around the "representative firm" and the "representative worker." But you are seeing here the macroeconomic effects of microeconomic distortion, and only visible in the amazingly large, widening and persistent differences in productivities, wages, and incomes across areas and companies.

(Random additional examples: The Allocation of Talent and U.S. Economic Growth, Chang-Tai Hsieh Chad Jones Erik Hurst and Pete  Klenow; "About one-quarter of growth in aggregate output per person [from 1960 to 2010] can be explained by the improved allocation of talent," talented african-americans and women moving in to occupations from which they had been excluded. See above eye popping numbers.; Chang Tai Shieh and Pete Klenow, Misallocation and Manufacturing in China and India, or keep browsing all these authors' websites.)

3) Regulation again. There is a deeper lesson in this story for my call to measure the cost of regulations. The usual measures -- hours spent filling out forms, costs of activities required by regulators, wages of compliance employees and lawyers -- are completely meaningless. Suppose that getting a building permit in the Bay Area took 5 minutes. (It doesn't. It's an amazingly wasteful and time consuming process. But suppose it did.) But they just say no. Well, the cost of regulation measured that way would be zero. Businesses would answer surveys, "Regulations? They aren't a problem. It's just too darn expensive here." Economics is always about the unseen.

The cost of regulation is in the higher prices it imposes, the businesses that don't get started, the people who can't move here to earn the high wages that high productivity brings, the higher tax rates we all must pay to bail out social security medicare and pensions because the tax base is half as large as it should be, the personal social and government costs of the islands of poverty we have created away from the productive cities, and so on.

Glaeser and Gyourko is a great readable summary of broader issues in housing economics. This is going on a bit, so I'll give you one quote and save the rest for another day
In some parts of America, there has been a revolution in the regulation of home building over the past 50 years (Glaeser, Gyourko and Saks, 2005). For most of U.S. history, local economic booms were met with local building booms, so labor could follow shocks to local productivity. However, between the 1960s and the 1990s, it became far more difficult to build in the nation’s most desirable locations, especially those along the coasts. Higher economic productivity in San Francisco now leads to higher prices, not more homes and more workers (Ganong and Shoag, 2013). This change has both led to a transfer of wealth to a few lucky homeowners and to a distorted labor market where people move to regions such as the Sunbelt that make it particularly easy to build (Glaeser and Tobio, 2008).
(YIMBY stands for yes in my backyard, a new movement that even here in the Bay area recognizes that letting people build houses and apartments might lower housing costs.)

Update: See also "Tarnishing the Golden State: Regulations and the US Slowdown" by Kyle  Herkenho , Lee  Ohanian and Ed Prescott. From the abstract, the finding,
Deregulating existing urban land from 2014 restriction levels back to 2000 restriction levels would increase US GDP growth by nearly .5% per annum from 2000 to 2014, bringing output and TFP growth roughly in line with their historical trends. The most significant expanding regions from these hypothetical deregulations are California, New York, and the Mid-Atlantic.
A half percentage point of growth is still huge. What's the logic? As in Hsieh and Moratti, counterfactuals must come from a model
We use a variety of state-level data sources, including the USDA, the Census and the BEA to develop a general equilibrium spatial model of the US states
... general equilibrium congestion forces in the market for housing and land offset some of the gains from deregulation
I get an inkling here that there is a production function with decreasing returns to scale, so not everyone can move tomorrow to SF (if they had a place to live) and earn currently high salaries. Just how many more people could benefit from whatever is the local magic is of course the key question.

Thanks to a correspondent for the link.

Wild health care proposal

I found a lovely post on health care full of wild ideas at market-ticker.org. You may not agree with all the proposals -- wild even by my standards.  But it is full of interesting detail on what's wrong with the microeconomics of health care delivery, as opposed to the usual focus on health insurance, and who pays, ignoring the vast dysfunction of the underlying market. 

A few choice quotes to whet your appetite
All providers must post, in their offices and on a public web site without any requirement to sign in or otherwise identify oneself to access it, a full and complete price list which shall apply to every person....  
All customers must be billed for actual charges at the same price on a direct basis at the time the service or product is rendered to them.  This immediately and permanently decouples "insurance" from the provision of care.  The current system of an "explanation of benefits" that often features a "negotiated discount" of some 90% is nothing other than an extortion racket and is arguably felonious...  All medical records are the property of, and shall be delivered to, the customer at the time of service in human readable form (a PDF provided on common consumer computer media such as a "flash stick" shall comply with this requirement.)  Any coding or other symbols on said chart must include a key to same in English delivered at the same time....  
All surgical providers of any sort must publish de-identified procedure counts and account for all complications and outcomes, updated no less often than monthly. Consumers must be able to shop not only on price, but also on outcome... 
Auxiliary services (e.g. medical or dental Xrays, lab testing, etc) may not be required to be purchased at the point of use.  If you wish to buy your tests from the lab down the street (which also must post a price) that's up to you.... 
Any test or diagnostic that carries no exposure to drugs or radiation, nor is invasive beyond a blood draw, may be purchased without doctor order or prescription... 
No government funded program or government billed invoice will be paid for medical treatment where a lifestyle change will provide a substantially equivalent or superior benefit that the customer refuses to implement.  The poster child for this is Type II diabetes, where cessation of eating carbohydrates and PUFA oils, with the exception of moderate amounts of whole green vegetables (such as broccoli) will immediately, in nearly all sufferers, return their blood sugar to near normal or normal levels.  The government currently spends about 25% of Medicare and Medicaid dollars on this one condition alone and virtually all of it is spent on people who can make this lifestyle change with that outcome but refuse... 
Health insurance companies must sell true insurance to sell any health-related policy at all.  A true insurance policy is defined as one that (1) does not cover any condition you have received treatment for over the last 24 months...
And so on. For my tastes it suffers from the usual vagueness about the subject of all these sentences. Is transparent pricing, for example, a new set of regulations? Why don't hospitals already post prices, unlike airlines which do so voluntarily? Which regulations are stopping hospitals from competing on price, and maybe we should get rid of those rather than pass new regulations? But apart from the question whether this is new rules or just a vision of how things should be, it's an interesting and refreshing and totally out of the box view.

A better r*

The Chicago Booth Review published here a much cleaned up and nicely formatted version of my earlier blog post on r*.  If you missed the original and you're curious about r* issues, or just curious what the heck r* is anyway, this version is better.

...

Long run money

Continuing in the Il Sole series on Italy and the Euro, Alberto Bagnai writes that the euro is a "big defeat for the economics profession'' here in English, here in Italian.  He takes particular issue with my earlier case for a common currency, here in English, in Italian, and blog post.
"John Cochrane’s idea that money is irrelevant for growth (economists say that money is “neutral”) not only clashes with major scientific results, such as Dani Rodrik’s analysis of the role of excessively strong exchange rates in slowing the growth of a country, but also with what the European institutions are finally admitting through clenched teeth: the reforms are causing deflation and failing to promote employment in any decisive way (footnote 23 in the above-mentioned ECB Economic bulletin).
The best economists had also addressed this point: the negative consequences of structural reforms on the productivity of labour were illustrated by Robert Gordon in 2008. For Cochrane, money is like oil in a motor. The metaphor is (unwittingly) correct. Bad management of oil has long-period consequences like bad management of currency: in the first case the head fuses and the motor stops; in the second a continent, and the world economy stops.
If De Grauwe is incoherent with data and Cochrane with theories,..."
I have long been accused of being theoretically pure but incoherent about the "real world." (As if the real world could ever conform to no theory, rather than a better theory). This is the first time I, or the proposition of long-run monetary neutrality, have been accused of theoretical incoherence.


First let's be clear what we're talking about. My article was clearly about long-run growth. And I wittingly made the oil comparison -- and also said that bad monetary policy, like not enough oil, can drag an economy down.
"For today, let's focus on the long-run question, leaving out for now the transition and any immediate benefits and costs...  
Remember first that monetary policy cannot substantially improve long-run growth. Long-run growth comes from people and productivity, how much each person can produce per hour of work.... Improvements in long-run growth come only from structural reform, not monetary machination. 
Money is like oil in a car. Bad monetary policy, like too little oil, can drag an economy down. But after a point more oil will not help you to go faster — you need a bigger engine."
We shouldn't be arguing about things I didn't say!

But to the substantive point.  How about "the idea that money is irrelevant for growth (economists say that money is “neutral”) not only clashes with major scientific results, such as Dani Rodrik’s analysis of the role of excessively strong exchange rates in slowing the growth of a country"

The clearly stated proposition is that money is irrelevant for long-run growth. Italy's postwar miracolo economico was not the result of a finely calibrated monetary policy under the Lira. The fact that Italians today are so much better off than their ancestors in 1917, 1817, or, heck, 1217, is just not centrally about better monetary policy under the Lira than under gold coins.

Rodrik? Sure. Out of whack anything can cause trouble for a while. A stack of dishes in the kitchen causes a spat. That's not a reason to divorce.

Structural reforms not working? What structural reforms? In my view, they haven't started. Call me when you can hire and fire people, government spending is under 50% of GDP, marginal tax rates are less than half, rent control is gone, it takes less than a decade to get a building permit, or when the World Bank ease of doing business ranking doesn't look like this


Update: Alberto Mingardi graciously came to my defense in the arguments following this post. Yes, I got rent control wrong (it was a big problem the last time I lived in Italy, but this tells you how long ago that was.) Alberto points out that it's still hard to evict people, as it is in the US. And he goes over a number of detailed sands in the Italian gears.  

Fintech and Shadow Banks

"Fintech, Regulatory Arbitrage, and the Rise of Shadow Banks" is an interesting new paper by  Greg Buchak, Gregor Matvos, Tomasz Piskorski, and Amit Seru

1. Shadow banks and fintech have grown a lot.
the market share of shadow banks in the mortgage market has nearly tripled from 14% to 38% from 2007-2015. In the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) mortgage market, which serves less creditworthy borrowers, the market share of shadow banks increased...from 20% to 75% of the market. In the mortgage market, “fintech” lenders, have increased their market share from about 5% to 15% in conforming mortgages and to 20% in FHA mortgages during the same period

2. Where are they expanding? They seem to be doing particularly well in serving lower income borrowers -- FHA loans.  They also can charge higher rates than conventional lenders, apparently a premium for convenience of not having to sit in the bank for hours and fill out forms,


Consider Quicken Loans, which has grown to the third largest mortgage lender in 2015. The Quicken “Rocket Mortgage” application is done mostly online, resulting in substantial labor and office space savings for Quicken Loans. The “Push Button. Get Mortgage” approach is also more convenient and faster for internet savvy consumers....
Among the borrowers most likely to value convenience, fintech lenders command an interest rate premium for their services. 
They also specialize in refinancing
Sector shadow banks have gained larger market shares in the refinancing market relative to financing house purchases directly. One possible reason for this segmentation is that traditional banks are also substantially more likely to hold loans on their own balance sheet than shadow banks. Approximately one fourth of traditional banks loans in HMDA are held on their own balance sheet. For shadow banks, the share is closer to 5%. Because refinancing loans held on the balance sheet cuts directly into a bank’s profit, their incentives to refinance are smaller..
This is a really cool point.

Our mortgage system is based on a rather crazy product, the fixed rate mortgage with a costly option to refinance. No other country does this. I know a lot of finance professors, and none of them can tell you the optimal refinancing rule. (It takes a statistical model of the term structure of interest rates and a complicated numerically solved dynamic program.) A lot of the system seems to be price discrimination by pointless complexity, a disease that permeates contemporary America.

Banks are on the other end of this. The bank holding your mortgage doesn't want you to refinance -- it wants you to keep paying the higher interest rate.  Unless, that is, it can get you to refinance too early and charge a lot of fees for it.  The natural product would be a automatically refinancing mortgage, in which a computer program automatically gives you a lower rate when it's time. It's not hard to figure out why banks don't offer that. In a competitive market, then, a third company would come in and offer refinancing, forcing the banks' hands. Competition is always the best consumer protection. And that seems to be exactly what we're seeing here.

3. Forces. A really good part of the paper (take notice economics PhD students) is how it teases out casual effects. I won't cover that in detail to keep the post from growing too long. A paper is not about its "findings" in the abstract, but the facts and logic in the paper. Some hints of the evidence follow.

To what extent are shadow banks and fintech stepping in to fill regulatory constraints, and to what extent is it just technology?

a) Some is technology, seen by this comparison.
Fintech lenders, for which the origination process takes place nearly entirely online... By comparing .. fintech and non-fintech shadow banks, we compare lenders who face similar regulatory regimes, thus isolating the role of technology. First, we find some evidence that fintech lenders appear to use different models (and possibly data) to set interest rates. Second, the ease of online origination appears to allow fintech lenders to charge higher rates, particularly among the lowest-risk, and presumably least price sensitive and most time sensitive borrowers.
b) The shadow banks primarily originate and then sell loans, and that business is practically all through government agencies these days. Private securitization fell off the cliff in 2008 and has not come back. 
In their current state, fintech lenders are tightly tethered to the ongoing operation of GSEs and the FHA as a source of capital. While fintech lenders may bring better services and pricing to the residential lending market, they appear to be intimately reliant on the political economy surrounding implicit and explicit government guarantees. How changes in political environment impacts the interaction between various lenders remains an area of future research.
In an otherwise cautious paper, I think this goes much too far. If a private securitization market existed, as it did before 2008, could shadow banks sell to them? Is the demise of private securitization just because the government killed it with the taxpayer subsidy implied by government guarantees? Absent guarantees would we just have a private industry that costs 20 basis points more? Just because finch now sells to government-guaranteed securitizers does not mean it must sell that way.

c) But the elephant in the room -- are shadow banks filling in where regulations keep transitional banks from going?
Unlike shadow banks, traditional banks are deposit taking institutions, and are thus subject to capital requirements, which do not bind shadow banks. If capital requirements are the constraint that increases the cost of extending mortgages for traditional banks, we should see larger entry of shadow banks in places in which capital requirement constraints are more binding. Indeed, we find a larger growth of shadow banks in counties in which capital constraints have tightened more in the last decade
In case you missed the point,
By comparing the lending patterns and growth of shadow bank lenders, we demonstrate shadow bank lenders expand among borrower segments and geographical areas in which regulatory burdens have made lending more difficult for traditional, deposit-taking banks.
"..the additional regulatory burden faced by banks opened a gap that was filled by shadow banks. "
We argue that shadow bank lenders possess regulatory advantages that have contributed to this growth. First, shadow bank lenders’ growth has been most dramatic among the high-risk, low-creditworthiness FHA borrower segment, as well as among low-income and high-minority areas, making loans that traditional banks may be unable hold on constrained and highly monitored balance sheets. Second, there has been significant geographical heterogeneity in bank capital ratios, regulator enforcement actions, and lawsuits arising from mortgage lending during the financial crisis, and we show that shadow banks are significantly more likely to enter in those markets where banks have faced the most regulatory constraints.
4. Policy

The paper is very careful not to make policy implications. I am under no such limitation.

It is too easy to take the last point and conclude "Regulations are hurting the banks! Get rid of them so banks can get their business back!" But that does not follow (which is a good reason the paper does not say it!)

Banks have capital and risk regulations because they fund their activities with deposits and short term debt. Those liabilities are prone to runs and financial crises. So in fact, one can come to quite the opposite conclusion:

The rise of fintech proves that there is no essential economic tie between loan origination and deposits or other short-term financing 

(Italicized because this is an important point at the end of a long post.) Maybe we want the crisis-prone traditional banking model to die out where it is not needed!

Update: Pedro Gete and Michael Rehr also find government-sponsored securitization helps the rise of fin-tech.

Trade Haiku

George Shultz and Martin Feldstein, in the Washington Post
If a country consumes more than it produces, it must import more than it exports. That’s not a rip-off; that’s arithmetic. 
If we manage to negotiate a reduction in the Chinese trade surplus with the United States, we will have an increased trade deficit with some other country. 
Federal deficit spending, a massive and continuing act of dissaving, is the culprit. Control that spending and you will control trade deficits.
That's not an excerpt, it's the whole thing. Someday, I will learn to be this concise.



A Healthy Reform?

Holman Jenkins and Cliff Asness have worthy commentaries on the health insurance reform effort.

Jenkins has quite a few fresh thoughts. He also gets the incurable optimist award for viewing the bill as the "inklings of a salvation" for America’s health-care system. It's possible. Whether it is likely depends on your views of the political process.

Individual insurance:

Jenkins' freshest thought comes last:
We’ll say it again, now for the Senate’s benefit: Apply a few GOP-style fixes and ObamaCare, or something like it, becomes a solution to America’s health-care muddle. You could phase out every other federal program, including Medicare, Medicaid and the giant tax handout to employers, and roll their beneficiaries into ObamaCare.
This wisdom is exactly the opposite of most current commentary, and, here in grumpy-land, where it seems the political process may be heading.

Yes, if any memory of markets remains, the goal should be to get everyone on individual insurance -- functional, portable, individual, lifetime, guaranteed-renewable, competitive health insurance, married to mercilessly competitive innovative and disruptive health care supply. People who need help -- sick and poor -- get it by subsidies to buy that insurance. Period. (Newcomers, some of my many writings on this topic are here.)

I fear we are going in the opposite direction. I fear that the non-subsidized individual market is going to shrink more and more, to become more and more an insignificant, government run, dysfunctional waystation for a handful of unlucky self-employed and young people, on their way to employer care, a government program (medicare, medicaid, VA, etc.) or now to a miserly high-risk pool.


Most of the Obamacare expansion of coverage was into medicare, or by people getting premium subsidies on the exchanges, and by pressure for expanded employer-basded coverage. The market of people paying actual premiums for individual insurance remains tiny.  Commenters point out the apparent pathology that Congress is wasting so much time on a tiny sliver of the population, how most of us have "just fine" coverage through employers, medicare, medicaid, VA, government employee plans, retiree plans, and so on. As if this is the right way to run things.

Parts of the Republican bill do seem helpful towards reviving the individual market. The vision that we should all be there, as we are all in the individual home, auto, and life insurance market; as well as the vision that the central problem is a supply system made dysfunctional by cross-subsidies and resultant anti-competitive limitations, I don't see yet in the legislative proposals and surrounding commentary.  That is a bad sign for the politics of Jenkins' (and my) vision. It is not ignorance. My impression is that most people involved understand the promised land perfectly well, they just don't think it can get two votes in the senate, let alone 51 or 61.

Mandate

Jenkins offers equally fresh thinking on the mandate
...In a world where individual insurance is fairly priced, a mandate would be less burdensome. As candidate Obama said in 2008, with a smidgen of hyperbole, if health insurance is a good deal, nobody would need to be forced to buy it. 
...The philosophical premises of the Republican and Democratic individual mandates could not be further apart. The original Republican mandate, hatched by the Heritage Foundation in 1989, was aimed at making sure would-be free riders paid their fair share, no longer transferring their financial risk to the taxpayer or other health-care consumers. 
ObamaCare turned the mandate into a tax—a way to overcharge the young, healthy and (let’s face it) male to generate funds to subsidize voter blocs Democrats wanted to subsidize.
The economic argument for a mandate of the Heritage type is pretty strong, as we have mandates for auto insurance. Given that we are not going to allow people to die in the gutter, then a mandate protects the finances of such government-provided charity care (or government mandated cross subsidies) to require that everyone has at least bare-bones catastrophic coverage, to cover... well, whatever it is that we are not willing to say "no" to when they show up on the hospital doorstep. Which is a lot.

Even that argument for a mandate is quite limited. We don't let people die, or suffer untreated illness. But there is much less case that we should not be willing to bankrupt the improvident. Even Sweden and Denmark do that. If you don't buy health insurance and get a heart attack, the government and hospitals should happily burn through your bank account.  And then you get the care you need. The economic mandate really is really only needed for people with few resources, or who can't get around to filling out forms (a lot of us).

And, yes, the economics of insurance is ex-post transfers. Those who turn out to be healthier than expected, ex-post transfer resources to those who turn out to be sicker than expected.

But, Jenkins' great insight is, look how these valid economic arguments utterly perverted in the political system.

Neither the economic mandate, nor insurance itself, is the basis for massive, completely predictable transfers from one group to another. Under Obamacare, individual mandates, insurance mandates, and "community" rating turned in to a massive transfer from (as he put it) "the young, healthy and (let’s face it) male to generate funds to subsidize voter blocs Democrats wanted to subsidize." That is clearer in this weekend's other commentary. See Ross Douthat in the Times review section, for example), focusing on "tax cuts for the rich;" and commentary focusing on how it will "hurt old people" -- both taxes and handout to old people, only enacted with Obamacare, now apparently baked in stone. All this unitentionally makes Jenkins' point. This isn't about health insurance anymore. It's just redistribution.

Also, the trope of how millions will now be "denied access to health care" (once again confusing insurance and care). Actually, 10 million of the CBO scoring that the Republican plan would lead to millions losing coverage came down to the mandate. 5 million of that are  people eligible for Medicaid who, the CBO thinks, will simply not bother to sign up even for free insurance without the mandate.
ObamaCare went out of its way to be a bad deal for the young and healthy, who didn’t sign up. The GOP fix [5:1 premiums, much less mandated coverage], if adopted in the Senate, would go a long way toward letting individual premiums be fairly and attractively priced to these people.
It would. Sadly, coverage of what's going on in the Senate, covered say in the same WSJ issue "Senators tackle heath bill rewrite" will undo modest progress:
Among the provisions senators are tackling is one that allows insurers to charge older Americans five times as much as younger people and lets states obtain waivers that could make that disparity even larger. 
That old people are more expensive to care for than young people is not an insurable risk. Old people per se are not necessarily deserving of cross-subsidies. Old, poor people are, but because they're poor not because they're old. Most non-poor old people own a house, which they have paid off, and substantial assets.  Most wealth in the economy is owned by old people. Old people have lower expenses.  Limiting the ratio of young to old in mandated insurance is just one huge cross-generational transfer of wealth. (On top of, I might add, social security, which is an enormous transfer from the current young to the current old. The current young are not going to get such generosity when they get old.) The supreme court had it half right -- the mandate is a tax. The big tax is the "community rated" overpriced insurance.

Jenkins again: If we had universal individual insurance, and helped people by subsidizing its purchase,
Congress could start making rational judgments about whom to subsidize and whom not to subsidize. Do all seniors need a handout, or only the poor ones? [Or only the sick ones?] And surely no Congress would re-up to the current employer tax benefit, which gives its biggest handout to the highest earners while producing all the pathologies the employer-centric payment system is heir to.
Is that a typo? Surely no Congress should reup, or perhaps could, but I see no signs that no Congress  would.  The tax deduction for employer provided health payment plans seems as rooted as the equally silly and damaging tax deduction for mortgage interest.  (And kudos to WSJ for coming out against that one in the lead editorial.) The proposal to also exempt individual insurance payments from taxes at least undoes some damage by putting both on the same footing.

Why cross subsidize wealthy seniors so much? Well, they vote. And they vote Republican. Given that, it's amazing that the house even tried to put in 5:1 in favor of Bernie-Sanders voting youth.

In case you missed it, the tax deduction for employer provided group coverage, but not for employer or employee contributions to an individual portable plan, really is the original sin, or the fly that the little old lady swallowed on her way to death from horse. Preexisting conditions follow entirely from that -- who will pay for lifelong guaranteed renewable insurance if they plan to get a job and throw it away? People who get sick and leave their jobs are stuck. Well, solve that with community rating, guaranteed issue, forced cross-subsdies, limits to competition.. and here we are.

Preexisting conditions. 
In principle, this should be a transitional problem in a world where everyone has access to attractive, fairly priced health insurance. By giving new options to the states, the House bill would make subsidizing pre-existing conditions a general obligation of the taxpayer as it always should have been.
So far so good. To amplify, in a portable, individual, universal, guaranteed-renewable competitive market, there is no preexisting conditions problem. But to get there, especially after Obamacare wiped out the existing guaranteed-renewable individual insurance, people currently sick are going to need an on-ramp. In Jenkins' optimistic view, the state high risk pools are such a transitory device. Jenkins is absolutely right that we need some transitory device.  By forcing cross-subsidies to give the illusion we are not taxing and spending, we achieve less at much greater cost.

I would prefer (as he might) a vibrant unconstrained competitive insurance market; that market would have guaranteed issue, but because insurers are allowed to charge any price so they will happily serve and compete for any customer without coercion. Then high risk pools subsidize the high premiums that people already sick have to pay, until we realistically can expect everyone to have bought guaranteed-renewable insurance before they got sick.

A good principle is that transitory devices need not be perfect. Another good principle is that imperfect transitory devices should be transitory.

However, with the portable, individual, universal, guaranteed-renewable competitive market nowhere in sight, I fear that this "transitional" problem is going to be semi-permanent.

What happened to portability, the long promise that you can buy insurance across state lines?
State-based high risk pools are going to make it even harder for people to move from state to state. State-based insurance already does this to some extent. Under Obamacare the conceit was, with guaranteed issue and community rating, anyone could move, and just get insurance in the new state. That was never easy in practice. (Actually trying to buy individual insurance that covers anything, as we did for a daughter over 26, is a salutary exercise.)

In sum, I worry as advertised at the outset, that we are headed to a permanent state that the government runs ever expanding mediare, medicaid, VA, and so forth; employer-based group coverage is forever ensrhined, and the market for individual insurance of people actually paying premiums becomes completely dysfunctional, now really providing only catastrophic coverage for a tiny group of people who are essentially uninsured until they become sick, at which point they are transferred to a government provided high risk pool. The transitory has a way of becoming permanent.

Here I think Jenkins makes one tiny mis-step:
Republicans...wussed out with a semi-mandate, in which anybody who lets coverage lapse and then tries to re-enter the system will pay a penalty.
No, that is not a semi-mandate! That was one good step on the way to guaranteed renewable coverage. You buy health insurance not so that "someone else" will pay for your predictable expenses, and not so much for the chance that you might have a catastrophe this year. You buy health insurance so that if you get sick, you can still buy health insurance next year!  You should face a healthy incentive to stay insured. The imperfection of the Republican plan is that it limited the penalty (insurers would charge larger penalties for those who lapsed coverage, and could not charge more than 5:1) not that it imposed a penalty.

However, sometimes half step may not work half as well as a whole step. In a true GR system, if you drop out, and fail even to purchase the option to buy insurance later, then you get sick, you will be charged the full newly rated price. That's the only way to have insurers voluntarily cover you, without cross-subsidizing from someone else, and thus without banning competition. In that case you always have an incentive to sign up, quick, before you get even sicker. With a fixed and capped penalty for signing up again, now you have no incentive to hurry. You're going to pay the same penalty no matter how sick you get or how long you wait. So critics are right that a new group of people waiting to get really sick before they sign up again and pay the penalty will crop up.

Asness

If all of this is depressing you and you want a good old romp through free market heath care and reform, read Cliff Asness 

Myth #2:  The pre-ObamaCare system was ‘insurance’ 
It was not a system of insurance. Insurance, as practiced everywhere else but healthcare, is about catastrophes. What we had was a government-subsidized payment plan funneled through insurance companies. 
... Due primarily to the tax subsidy given to employer-provided healthcare (a bipartisan, so-far-untouchable disaster), catastrophic health insurance is not Americans’ norm. Rather, employers provide essentially all healthcare from basic health maintenance and symptom relief to the most expensive life-saving procedures, and they do it because the government massively subsidizes this approach. 
This is odd. You don’t go to your car insurer to fill your car with gas or to your homeowner’s insurance company to change a light bulb. Why do you go to your health insurance company for everyday medical services? That is not insurance, it is tax-subsidized provision of all your healthcare needs, and it causes two of our system’s biggest problems. 1) Health coverage is not portable, as it’s employer-provided, and 2) consumers are insulated from the cost of basic healthcare because they don’t pay directly for services. Educated consumers spending their own money would be far better shoppers for healthcare. ...Paying $5 for a prostate exam is demeaning to both parties. 
Myth #3: Stopping insurance companies from charging based on pre-existing conditions is the one good part of ObamaCare 
Even many Republicans fall for this one, perhaps because it polls well. In these days of horrible discord, partisanship, and uncivil discourse (actually very much like the other 200+ years of the Republic) it is nice to know we can all still get together to rally around a really dumb idea....
It goes on like this. Go read the original.

Final political thoughts

You will notice that I'm not really getting in to the weeds on the Republican plan, and you may be disappointed by a lack of close analysis.  I've written here at length about how health insurance and health care (for the last time, not the same thing!) should be fixed. There is no point in repeating that.  The plan has lots of steps in the right direction.  But to score it by economic purists' standards is unfair and unproductive.  The Republican plans are clearly crafted by what the leaders think they can get through politically. Score them as such -- and from my limited knowledge of politics, they strike me as bloody brilliant given the current situation of a narrow majority in the Senate, "resistance" close to "rebellion" from the other side, and nobody really in fear of the President or party discipline. This really isn't an economic issue at this point. If they can get a few steps in the right direction, show they can govern, and set the stage for more comprehensive reform later, there is hope.

Jenkins adds
P.S. Don’t kid yourself that Democrats have a plan other than blindly defending more and more subsidies for more and more health-care consumers. Single-payer is not a plan. It’s an invitation for the health-care industry—doctors, hospitals, the research establishment—simply to turn their full attention to serving the self-paying rich.
As so much of America, the veneer of government concern for common people leads instead to private schools, gated communities, private jets, and soon concierge doctors and hospitals for the 1%, those with connections, and the Washington elite. And lousy public schools, public transport, and coming soon lousy health care for the rest.

Wonderful Loaf


A charming animated free-market poem by Russ Roberts, on the invisible hand, at http://wonderfulloaf.org

The "read the poem" link includes much interesting annotation.

Mild critique: I would rather the "planner" be a well-meaning economist faced with impossible information problems than a darkly sinister white guy in a suit. It looks like all we need is better  planners. And the bakers seem really happy about all that competition and free entry, whereas real bakers quickly band together to demand regulation, occupational licensing, and other restrictions. But I'm just whining, it's a good romp through the invisible hand in a mythic war-free and Disney-clean 1940s Europe.

PhD Scholarships at UCD School of Economics

UCD School of Economics is pleased to announce a call for applications for the 2017-18 PhD Scholarship scheme. The aim of the scheme is to attract applicants of the highest academic standards to participate in the UCD School of Economics PhD programme (details here) and provide them with the training, experience and mentorship necessary to their professional development.

These PhD Scholarships will comprise an annual tax-free annual stipend of between €12,000 and €15,000 plus a full waiver of fees. The scheme is open to both new applicants and existing PhD students, with the understanding that the stipend and fee waiver will continue to be provided to students up to and including their fourth year of PhD studies, subject to their continuing to make satisfactory progress in their studies and meeting the terms and requirements of their scholarship.

Students in receipt of a Scholarship are required to work as tutors in either undergraduate or graduate modules taught by the School of Economics. This will allow PhD students to develop the practical application of their academic skills by ongoing training and experience of tutorial teaching, assessment and pedagogical development. This taught component will amount to no more than 50 hours of teaching during each of our 12-week teaching semesters.

A selection board of School of Economics faculty members will review applications and make its recommendations on selection to the Head of School. Applications will be evaluated and ranked by the Selection Board according to the following criteria:
Academic excellence (transcripts, previous research experience, etc.)
The academic testament of referees;
Quality and clarity of the research proposal;
Fit with the research strengths of the School;
Teaching potential (past teaching experience, English proficiency, etc.);
Availability of other funding to applicant (such as Irish Research Council awards).

Complete applications must be submitted on or before 18 May 2017. New applicants who are short-listed for a scholarship will then be contacting for a short interview, either in person, via phone, or via computer (such as Skype). The school will then conduct interviews with each finalist, either in person, via phone, or via the computer (such as Skype). Scholarships will be awarded on approximately May 31, 2017. Successful applicants have until 15 June 2017 to notify the school of their decision whether or not to accept the scholarship. Additional scholarships may be awarded in June or July depending on availability.

For students who are unsuccessful in applying for a PhD scholarship, the school also offers other forms of financial assistance, including fee waivers, hourly tutoring contracts, and marking exams.

If you are interested in applying for these scholarships, please review the associated terms and conditions carefully.

Click here for the application form. Completed forms should be emailed to economics@ucd.ie

Click here for the terms and conditions for the scholarships.

Irish Revenue Randomised Trials

This month the Irish Revenue Commissioners (responsible for tax administration) published the results of 20 randomised trials they have conducted in the area of behavioural design. This is a significant report in terms of Irish public policy and also contributes to the growing international literature in this area. A summary of the report is below. 
While audit and other risk management interventions are effective compliance tools, they can be expensive and time consuming for both Revenue and taxpayers. Targeted treatments using behavioural science can be a complementary and cost-effective tool to improve compliance. A summary of key findings across four behavioural insights is below. 
Deterrence: Deterrence strategies (e.g., highlighting possible sanctions) dissuade taxpayers from non-compliant behaviour. The research confirms that deterrent effects significantly improve taxpayer compliance, particularly when combined with other insights. They impact different taxpayer segments differently. 
Simplification and Salience: Compliance or other behaviours can be enhanced through simpler presentation of information and by drawing attention to key details. For tax administrations, this may involve highlighting the third-party information held, for example through correspondence or the pre-filling of tax returns. Information in any communications should be presented in the most clear and simple way possible, including bolding and centred text. 
Personalisation: International research has shown the potential of more personalised correspondence, which is increasingly becoming a possibility given technological advancements. Revenue trials confirm that personalisation leads to greater and quicker engagement, especially when multiple elements of personalisation are applied. 
Social Norms: The behaviour of others can influence an individual’s choices. Revenue research finds that social norms are generally not effective at influencing behaviour. However, there is limited evidence indicating that these may improve taxpayer compliance when combined with other insights. 
According to a meta-analysis, which weights the result of 20 trials by sample size, the most effective insights tend to be deterrence (+8.0% improvement in targeted behaviour), personalisation (+4.0%) simplification and salience (+3.3%) and social norms (-1.6%). The wording and design of communications can affect taxpayer compliance. Even seemingly insignificant changes to correspondence can significantly change behaviour. While these lessons have mainly been learned from letters, they should be considered in any Revenue communication with taxpayers.

Douthat and Feldstein on Euro

In case you missed it, this Sunday featured a creditable effort by the NY Times to look out of the groundhog hole. You have likely followed the explosion resulting from Bret Stephens' first column. Likewise, Ross Douthat tried to explain the attraction of Marine LePen.  I'm not a LePen fan, but appreciated his honest effort to explain how the other side say things.

I was interested in Douthat's views on the euro:
But on the other hand, our era’s “enlightened” governance has produced an out-of-touch eurozone elite lashed to a destructive common currency,..
There is no American equivalent to the epic disaster of the euro, a form of German imperialism with the struggling parts of Europe as its subjects... 
And while many of her economic prescriptions are half-baked, her overarching critique of the euro is correct: Her country and her continent would be better off without it.
Douthat does not pretend to be an economist, and I have no beef with his expressing such views. Because such views are commonplace conventional wisdom from our policy elite. And if the euro falls apart, they will bear a lot of blame for its passing. Be careful what you write, people might be listening.  No, when Germany sends Porsches to Greece in return for worthless pieces of paper, it is not Germany who got the better of the deal. And while you're at it, get rid of that silly common meter, and restore proper nationalism of weights and measures too. (Of course perhaps my admiration for the euro is wrong. Then they will deserve credit for the wave of prosperity that flows over Europe once it unleashes the shackles of the common currency dragging it down. )

As a concrete example, consider  Martin Feldstein writing in the Il Sole series on the Euro, (I don't mean to pick on Feldstein. He has been a consistent anti-euro voice, arguing the great benefits for Italy and Greece of periodic inflation and devaluation. But he is just a good sober example of the common view in Cambridge-centered economic policy circles.)


Topic sentences:
Although Italy was an enthusiastic adopter of the euro when the single currency began, the Italian experience of the past decade suggests that was a mistake.
...it seems plausible that Italy’s economy would be in better condition today if Italy, like Britain, had decided to keep its own currency and therefore to be able to manage its own monetary policy and its own exchange rate.
Analysis:
Advocates of adopting the euro argued at the time that members of the Eurozone would be forced by market pressures to converge to a high common level of productivity and a corresponding level of real wages. That never happened. Instead, Germany powered ahead with rising productivity that has resulted in real per capita income 30% higher than Italy’s, an unemployment rate that is less than half Italy's and a trade surplus that is 8 % of its GDP.
Huh? It is a new proposition in monetary economics to me that adopting a common currency forces countries to move to common productivity, any more than adopting the meter forces countries to do so.  Alabama and California share a currency and not productivity. Fresno and Palo Alto share a currency and not productivity.   A common market in products with free movement of capital and labor might force out economic, legal, and regulatory inefficiency, but that would happen regardless of the units of measurement.

The most basic proposition in monetary economics: The choice of monetary unit has no effect on long-run productivity or any other aspect of the long-run real economy. Using the euro vs. the lira has no effect on long-run productivity, any more than using the meter forces Italian tailors to cut Norwegian-sized suits, or that using the Kilo forces Italian restaurants to serve bratwurst and beer rather than pizza and wine.
The countries that adopted the euro never satisfied the three conditions for a successful currency union: labor mobility, flexibility of real wages, and a common fiscal policy that transfers funds to areas that experience temporary increases in unemployment.
This is another repeated truism. In my view the main condition for a currency union was present in the euro and the problem was forgetting about it when the time came. In a currency union without fiscal union, bankrupt governments default just like bankrupt companies. Neither labor mobility (which exists in Europe), flexibility of real wages (doubtful in the US) or common fiscal policy (also limited in the US) are necessary. Europe lived under a common currency -- the gold standard -- for hundreds of years. Sovereigns defaulted.

I suspect Feldstein means by "common currency" far more than I do. I mean, we agree to use a common currency. I suspect Feldstein means far more than that, including that no government debt may ever default and that the ECB must print money to ensure that fact. Like all disagreements perhaps this one simply reflects a difference in meaning of the words. If so, it would be good to say so. Objections to "the euro" are not objections to a common currency per se, but objections to the rest of the legal, regulatory, banking, fiscal, and policy framework that accompanies the euro.

To be fair, there is also a different underlying world view here. In Feldstein's world, national governments and central banks can be relied on to diagnose "shocks," and artfully devalue currencies just enough to "offset shocks" when and only when needed; in the european case likely imposing "capital controls" as well, but to do this rarely enough that investors will still buy government bonds, invest in their countries, and avoid the slide to banana republic inflation, repression, and trade and investment closure. In my world, as I think in the real world of Italy and Greece before the euro, national currencies are not such a happy tool of benevolent dirigisme. The commitment not to devalue, inflate, and grab capital after the fact is good for growth and investment before the fact. A government sober enough to use Feldstein's tools wisely is also sober enough to borrow wisely when offered low rates. A government not sober enough to borrow wisely when offered low rates is not sober enough to artfully devalue, inflate, grab capital "just this once" in response to shocks.


WalBank

Arnold Kling's Askblog quotes Robert J. Mann
Wal-Mart’s application to form a bank ignited controversy among disparate groups, ranging from union backers to realtor’s groups to charitable organizations. The dominant voice, though, was that of independent bankers complaining that the big-box retailer would drive them out of business. Wal-Mart denied any interest in competing with local banks by opening branches, claiming that it was interested only in payments processing. Distrusting Wal-Mart, the independent bankers urged the FDIC to deny Wal-Mart’s request and lobbied state and federal lawmakers to block Wal-Mart’s plans through legislation. Ultimately, WalMart withdrew its application, concluding that it stood little chance of overcoming the opposition.
Mann also writes
... I argue that permitting Wal-Mart to have a bank would have a salutary effect on the relatively uncompetitive market for payment networks. The dominant position of Visa and MasterCard, in which payments are priced above cost to subsidize credit, inevitably will give way to a world in which payment services are priced at cost, or even below cost as a loss-leader to attract customers to other goods and services.  
As the first quote shows, Walmart was only trying to process payments more efficiently -- because it already saw the chance to offer banking services, lend, and other banking functions would be blocked.

Arnold also points to this by Lawrence J. White.

Arnold sums up,
We are always told that we need regulation to protect consumers and make the financial system safer. That is the theory. The practice is that regulation very often gets used to limit competition. 
Many people in the US still do not have regular bank accounts, and perhaps wisely so as banks notoriously suck money from poor people with pesky fees. Yet cashing a social security check remains a problem. Imagine small town America in which Walmart also offers banking services.

If it's not obvious, Walmart banks would be much safer than traditional banks. A bank tied to a huge retailer would not be financed by astronomical leverage, and if the bank lost money the equity holders of Walmart would pick up the losses.

Walmart has also faced a lot of resistance and restrictions in opening clinics. Imagine small town America in which simple, cheap Walmart clinics can offer a much wider range of services.

It's worth remembering how much opposition Walmart already overcame. It was the Uber of its day. A&P, its predecessor, was widely opposed, as was Walmart. Walmart still faces union opposition -- as I left it was still blocked from operating in the city of Chicago. Imagine the south side of Chicago populated with Walmarts, Walclinics and Walbanks! Thank its legislators and regulators for protecting its citizens from that nightmare.

Update:

An excellent blog post by Larry White on Walmart's troubles in starting a bank. A primary obstacle is the rule that bank holding companies can't be engaged in "commerce." Larry also points out just how much the other banks use this to keep out competition.

the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 placed a three-year moratorium on the granting of deposit insurance to any new (or newly acquired) ILC. Although the moratorium expired in 2013, bank regulators appear to have “gotten the message” that the commerce-finance barrier should remain intact.

93 words, most of them wrong

In the WSJ, The 93 Words That Could Unlock $200 Billion in Bank Capital. This could be a great MBA final exam. Spot the errors: 
"Tucked inside a nearly 600-page legislative proposal to overhaul U.S. financial regulations are 93 words that could provide a windfall for bank investors seeking heftier dividends and share buybacks."
"Bank analysts at Barclays BCS -6.08% PLC estimate $236 billion in capital is tied up in operational risk at the four biggest U.S. banks alone"
"Bankers ... want to free up capital that could be returned to shareholders or used for more lending."
"Mr. Dimon added that U.S. banks now hold about $200 billion in capital against operational risk."
(I made it easier with italics, all mine.)

Windfall? When a company pays out dividends, the stock price goes down exactly by the amount of the dividend payment.

Capital is not tied up. Capital is a source of funds, not a use of funds. Capital is equity investment in the bank -- people give the bank money, in return for a stream of dividends.  Capital is not reserves -- cash lying around the vault.

Capital is already used for lending!  Banks get money from equity holders, bond holders, and deposits, and lend it out. Capital requirements are about the ratio of sources of money. (At best, lower capital requirements would allow banks to borrow more money without issuing more equity to lend. If they wanted to.) Capital is not reserves.

No bank "holds" capital, and I hope Mr. Dimon didn't actually say that, as much as he would like lower capital requirements. Capital is not "held" like reserves.

This article does reflect nicely the total level of confusion in the debate about banking regulations. Colleagues contemplating clever complex schemes, take note.